Showing posts with label coronavirus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label coronavirus. Show all posts

23.1.21

The Problem Is Poverty, However We Label It


The prefixes ‘food’, ‘child’ or ‘fuel’ make life for 14 million poor Britons seem easily fixable. In truth, radical action is needed.

How ingenious are the British! Like the legendary Inuit people who coined 57 words for snow, we have devised a long list of clever aliases for the stuff that dominates everyday life. Know the ones I mean? Try food poverty. Fuel poverty. Child poverty. Clothing poverty. Transport poverty. Period poverty.

These are phrases mouthed in Westminster and plastered across newspapers (which, this week, are discussing “digital poverty”). They help shape the UK in the 21st century. But this ever-growing jungle of subcategories obscures the one true problem they have in common. It is poverty: the condition of not having enough money to live your life.

If your only choice of an evening is between skipping dinner or going to sleep in the cold before waking up in the cold, then you are not carefully selecting between food poverty and fuel poverty, like some expense-account diner havering over the French reds on a wine list. You are simply impoverished.

If you are using a sock as a sanitary towel, the problem lies not in the time of the month but in your lack of income – which doubtless means you’re also not getting enough food or heating. Gas bills might jump or petrol prices soar, but if those things tip you into all-out crisis, that’s because you were already poor.

Poverty cannot be shelved tidily under different classifications, like books in a library. It jabs its tentacles into all parts of your life, distorting and defining everything from how you feel about yourself to whether you live or die in this pandemic.

“Want” was how William Beveridge referred to poverty in his landmark report of 1942. For him it was the first of five “giant evils” that had to be slain in order to rebuild a bombed-out Britain. Today, however, it is the evil that dare not speak its name. It must instead be broken down into discrete categories, all the better to tuck into Whitehall documents or charity campaign strategies. In that fake neatness lies both great political hypocrisy and huge social danger.

Cabinet ministers hate using words as simple and shaming as poverty. It’s why the welfare secretary, Thérèse Coffey, brightly refers to those forced to live on donated tins as food bank “customers”. No, far more congenial to qualify and to narrow. Oh, it’s about “cashflow problems”, as the foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, so delightfully put it. Or schoolkids not having an internet dongle.

Smaller messes take less time and money to tidy away. Whereas, according to horrified allies of Rishi Sunak this week, keeping an extra £20 on universal credit amid a historic jobs crisis would cost £6bn a year, or 1p on income tax and 5p on fuel duty. Remember, in his first budget speech last March, Sunak admitted that Tory chancellors freezing fuel duty for nine years had cost the exchequer £110bn – and then froze it for another year.

Because anything is better than admitting that this all stems from one deep structural problem: that, going into the pandemic, more than 14 million Britons – more than one in five of us – did not have enough money to live on. Far more agreeable to dole out food parcels for a week here or there, to cut VAT on tampons, or to brief a couple of warning headlines aimed at the big energy firms.

Much better to wave around vouchers and an outsourced half-pepper than give money and power to people who have none. Because who knows what the poor might do if they were to – whisper it – choose for themselves? This is why Coffey’s predecessor, Iain Duncan Smith, blamed the problem of child poverty not on his colleagues slashing benefits – so as to teach mums and dad that “children cost money” – but on the parents themselves being drunks and smack addicts.

In IDS’s world, the undeserving poor are always with us. The undeserving rich, such as he, on the other hand, get to marry the daughter of a baron, live in a £2m mansion owned by an obliging father-in-law, and deliver speeches to moneymen at £5,000 a time.

Such are the deep prejudices faced by campaigners down the ages. The Child Poverty Action Group was formed 56 years ago, but at the outset its activists had no special interest in child poverty. The charity’s official history states: “‘Child poverty’ was not mentioned in the minutes of meetings. As the committee members saw it, poor children lived in poor families.” But just weeks before launch: “‘Child Poverty Action Group’ was adopted as the name … as likely to win more public sympathy than ‘family poverty’, which risked inciting rightwing tabloid rants about ‘scroungers.’”

This was in 1965, several years before George Osborne was even conceived. What giant strides this country has made.

Even so, those founders were spot on. In my years of reporting on poverty and inequality, one reliable rule of thumb is that the kids are last to go without. First to starve are the mums. They’re the ones who live on hot water and toast to keep the family in meals. But the terminally prejudiced cannot bear too much reality, and it is they who set the tone of the debate.

In his recent book The New Poverty, the journalist Stephen Armstrong recounts how the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, travelled in 2015 to Folkestone in Kent, where he met Graham and Lisa Sopp. The couple had moved there after Graham had lost his job as a security guard and Lisa was promised cleaning work. Then their new flat fell through, Lisa’s employer was taken over, and one of IDS’s benefits offices kept messing them about. Suddenly, they were sleeping in a tent on the cliffs, and Graham got very ill. They took to walking the clifftops, identifying the perfect spot from which to jump.

On meeting them, Welby observed: “There is no system in the world that will stop people having problems, but we must have a structure of support for people that meets not merely their financial needs but also their need to be treated as distinct human beings of infinite value.” That view doesn’t fit with a system where poor people queue for bags of surplus food, collect donated clothes for their babies and beg for help with their fuel bills and housing.

The new language of poverty, so managerial and sophisticated, conceals a vast and growing baseness. However highly evolved its jargon, however lauded its campaigning footballers, Britain in 2021 treats poor people not as people – not as our family, friends, neighbours. Instead, it views them as a ragbag of different physical needs to be met by a patchwork of largely volunteer organisations. And in doing so, we deny both their essential humanity – and ours.

Aditya Chakrabortty

9.12.20

Covid-19 vaccine: First person receives Pfizer jab in UK


A UK grandmother has become the first person in the world to be given the Pfizer Covid-19 jab as part of a mass vaccination programme. Margaret Keenan, who turns 91 next week, said the injection she received at 06:31 GMT was the "best early birthday present". It was the first of 800,000 doses of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine that will be dispensed in the coming weeks.

Up to four million more are expected by the end of the month.

Hubs in the UK are starting the rollout by vaccinating the over-80s and some health and care staff.
Senior NHS sources told the BBC "thousands of vaccinations" had taken place across the UK on Tuesday. Dubbing the day "V-day", Health Secretary Matt Hancock said it was "a tribute to scientific endeavour and human ingenuity and to the hard work of so many people.


"Today marks the start of the fightback against our common enemy, the coronavirus," he said.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on a visit to a London hospital to see some of the first people getting the jab, said getting vaccinated was "good for you and good for the whole country". Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said: "Today we should all allow ourselves a smile - but we must not drop our guard." On Tuesday, the UK government reported a further 616 people had died within 28 days of a positive test, taking the total, by that measure, to 62,033. A further 12,282 people tested positive for the virus. Second in line for the jab at University Hospital in Coventry was 81-year-old William Shakespeare from Warwickshire. At University Hospital, Coventry, matron May Parsons administered the very first injection to Ms Keenan.

"I feel so privileged to be the first person vaccinated against Covid-19," said Ms Keenan, who is originally from Enniskillen, Co Fermanagh.
"It's the best early birthday present I could wish for because it means I can finally look forward to spending time with my family and friends in the new year, after being on my own for most of the year.
"My advice to anyone offered the vaccine is to take it. If I can have it at 90, then you can have it too," she added.

Prof Stephen Powis, national medical director of NHS England, who witnessed the "historic moment", said: "We couldn't hug her but we could clap, and everybody did so in the room."

An emotional Sister Joanna Sloan said she had been looking forward to the vaccine for so long

Throughout the day, patients and health workers at some 50 hospitals around the UK have been getting the jab

The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine has also been found to be "safe and effective", according to a paper published on Tuesday and assessed by independent scientists.

Speaking in the Commons, the health secretary stressed people did not need to apply for the vaccine. He said the NHS would be in touch with those eligible and urged them to "please step forward for your country".

Mr Hancock went on to warn that there was "still a long march ahead", saying there were "worrying signs" of the virus growing in Essex, London and Kent.

New data released by national statisticians for the week ending 27 November showed that of the 14,106 deaths registered in the UK, nearly 3,400 involved Covid. This is 20% higher than the five-year average but similar to the percentages seen in the past two weeks.

NHS England chief executive Sir Simon Stevens called the first vaccinations "remarkable achievement", but cautioned it was a "first step" and "incredibly important" people continued to act sensibly.

On a visit to London's Guy's Hospital, the prime minister spoke to 81-year-old Lyn Wheeler, who was the first to receive the vaccine there.

"It is really very moving to hear her say she is doing it for Britain, which is exactly right - she is protecting herself, but also helping to protect the entire country," Mr Johnson said. Earlier, he thanked the NHS, volunteers and "all of the scientists who worked so hard to develop this vaccine". Labour's shadow health secretary Jon Ashworth said it was "absolutely fabulous" to see people getting the vaccine and thanked everyone involved in making it happen.

Some 800,000 doses of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine have been secured by the government to be administered in the coming weeks - although vaccination is not compulsory.

Orders have been placed for 40 million in total - enough for 20 million people, as two courses are needed. However, most supplies are not expected to become available until next year.

Mr Hancock said he expected it to take "several weeks" to get the first group of health workers, care staff and over-80s vaccinated.


18.11.20

OPINION | On his way out, Trump salts the earth behind him


"No president in American history has ever before spent the end of his time in office trying to discredit our democracy, degrade the federal government and set Americans against each other. And what of the Republican Party? They, too, are finishing the Trump presidency the way they started it, with a show of complicity and cowardice," - 
Paul Waldman 


This was probably the way we should have expected President Trump to finish his time in the White House: whining, lying, ignoring the duties of his office, desperate to keep his scam going and focused only on himself. But that Trump is being Trump should not for one second blind us to what is happening right now and how damaging it is. The destruction of the past four years was apparently not enough for him. So on his way out the door, Trump is salting the earth behind him.

It has been nearly two weeks since the election. President-elect Joe Biden won the electoral college by 306-to-232. His lead in the popular vote is 5.6 million and growing. Republican efforts to get courts to shut down counting and invalidate huge numbers of votes are being laughed out of court. This is over.


And what is the president doing? Complaining on Twitter.

He will not prevail, and everyone knows it. The White House staffers desperately spinning on his behalf know it. The Fox News hosts propagating conspiracy theories about stolen votes know it. Every elected Republican knows it. The only ones who don’t know it are the millions of Trump voters who are the targets of this noxious propaganda campaign, the ones being told that American democracy is worthy of nothing but contempt.
Trump tells them that our system of elections is impossibly corrupt, that only the Republican Party can legitimately claim power no matter what the will of the public actually is, and even that street violence is not only justified but should be celebrated when committed by the far right.Meanwhile, his White House instructs civil servants across the federal government to refuse to cooperate or even communicate with representatives of the incoming Biden administration, making the already complex task of the transition vastly more difficult. And while the coronavirus pandemic is positively exploding across the country — we’re now averaging more than 150,000 new cases and a thousand deaths per day — his administration has stopped even pretending it cares.

At the current pace, by the time Trump leaves office, more than 300,000 Americans will have died of covid-19. And even after he departs, every day more will die because Trump politicized simple public health measures, convincing his supporters that refusing to wear a mask to protect yourself and those around you is a great way to own the libs.

No president in American history has ever before spent the end of his time in office trying to discredit our democracy, degrade the federal government and set Americans against each other. And what of the Republican Party? They, too, are finishing the Trump presidency the way they started it, with a show of complicity and cowardice.

There are some Republicans, the most repugnant, who are enthusiastically whipping up anger and spreading lies about voter fraud, trying to convince their base that Biden will be an illegitimate usurper. At the other end, there are a few who have grudgingly acknowledged reality, admitting that yes, Biden won the election and will become president in January. But there are so few of the latter group that when one says, “I expect Joe Biden to be the next president of the United States,” it makes the new.
The rest of them are hiding, too craven to even answer that simple question. “We invited every single Republican senator to appear on Meet the Press this morning,” said NBC’s Chuck Todd on Sunday. “They all declined.” The reason was clear: They can’t defend Trump and don’t have the guts to tell the truth about what he’s doing.

So please, let’s not hear anyone praise those few Republicans willing to say that Biden is going to be president and the transition should proceed with some measure of professionalism. That’s nothing to be proud of. What we deserve is to hear Republicans say to Trump, “Stop this right now. You are hurting the country.”

But there are none who will do so. So to them we should say: The leader of your party is pouring poison into our national bloodstream, and if you can’t find the courage to say it’s wrong, don’t ever try to tell us again how patriotic you are.

Over the past four years, I’ve thought often about how just a few days after the 2016 election, President Barack Obama welcomed Trump into the Oval Office. Trump had turned himself from a reality show buffoon into a political figure by becoming the country’s foremost advocate of the racist “birther” lie, accusing Obama of not being a real American, then ran a campaign of fear and hatred to win the presidency.

Yet Obama was polite and gracious. Like every American president who came before him, he knew that what mattered at that moment was not the disgust he surely felt for his successor nor his fear of what the future might bring. What mattered was showing Americans that democracy is about all of us, a shared enterprise we have to work to sustain.

Later, Obama would leave Trump a letter welcoming him to the Oval Office, just as George W. Bush did for him and other presidents had done in the past. Here’s part of what it said:

We are just temporary occupants of this office. That makes us guardians of those democratic institutions and traditions — like rule of law, separation of powers, equal protection and civil liberties — that our forebears fought and bled for. Regardless of the push and pull of daily politics, it’s up to us to leave those instruments of our democracy at least as strong as we found them.


No president amasses a perfect record of protecting those democratic institutions and traditions. But at the moment their presidencies ended, every one — even those who left in disgrace — remembered that there are principles and commitments more important than their own petty grievances and wounded egos.

Until now.
Paul Waldman

11.11.20

The scientists who developed the Pfizer/BioNTech Covid-19 vaccine are a Turkish-German power couple


Scientists Ugur Sahin and Ozlem Tureci have dedicated their lives to the field of oncology and infectious diseases, and spent years pioneering personalized immunotherapy treatments for cancer.

But amid the coronavirus pandemic, the couple's groundbreaking research in the field of modified genetic code has catapulted them into the public eye, as the brains behind the world's first effective coronavirus vaccine.

Sahin, 55, and Tureci, 53, set up BioNTech in the central German city of Mainz in 2008. On Monday the company's partner, US pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, said their candidate vaccine was more than 90% effective in preventing infection in volunteers.

It uses the never-before-approved technology called messenger RNA, or mRNA, to spark an immune response in people who are vaccinated.

On a call with reporters on Tuesday, Sahin explained the significance of the news -- and sent a message of hope for the world.

"I think the good message for mankind is that we now understand that COVID-19 infections can be indeed prevented by a vaccine," he said.

Speaking to CNN on Monday, Pfizer CEO's Albert Bourla called it "the greatest medical advance" in the last 100 years.

While the vaccine is a huge step for the scientific community, Sahin and Tureci are veterans in the world of medical achievements.
The pair, both trained physicians, established their previous company, Ganymed Pharmaceuticals, in 2001 to work on developing cancer-fighting antibodies, eventually selling it for $1.4 billion in 2016.

The Turkish-German founder of BioNTech, Ugur Sahin, at his laboratory in November.

Chief Executive Sahin and Chief Medical Officer Tureci are listed among Germany's 100 richest people, according to the weekly Welt am Sonntag newspaper. On Tuesday, the market value of their Nasdaq-listed company jumped to $25.72 billion -- a massive leap from $4.6 billion last year.

But the couple's charitable ethos and longstanding commitment to academia and science appear to have kept them grounded, even as their work on the Covid-19 vaccine propels them into the global spotlight.
In May, the couple told CNN they felt compelled to "provide something for society," given the work they had done in their field over the last two decades.

Sahin was born in Iskenderun, a city on Turkey's Mediterranean coast. He moved to Cologne, Germany when he was four, where his father worked at a local Ford factory, according to Reuters.
He met Tureci, the daughter of a Turkish physician, when the pair were both embarking on their academic careers.

BioNTech's chief medical officer, Ozlem Tureci at the lab in November.

Sahin and Tureci bonded over a shared passion for cancer research, according to Reuters, who reported that the couple even began their wedding day in the research lab.

In January, after reading a scientific paper about the coronavirus in Wuhan, China, Sahin was taken by the "small step" from anti-cancer mRNA drugs to mRNA-based viral vaccines, Reuters reported.
BioNTech assigned 500 of its staff to work on the project with several potential mRNA compounds, eventually closing a partnership with Pfizer in March.

Their Covid-19 vaccine approach uses genetic material, mRNA, to trick cells into producing bits of protein that look like pieces of the virus. The immune system learns to recognize and attack those bits and, in theory, would react fast to any actual infection.

A researcher works inside the German BioNTech laboratory in November.
Sahin has been described as a "modest and humble" person by colleagues, including Matthias Theobald, a fellow oncology professor at Mainz University, who has worked with him for two decades.

Pfizer coronavirus vaccine news bodes well for other coronavirus vaccines, experts say:
"Despite his achievements, he never changed from being incredibly humble and personable," Matthias Kromayer, a board member of the MIG AG venture capital firm that has financially backed BioNTech, told Reuters on Monday.

Those attributes ring clear when listening to Sahin speak about the global race to stop the virus.
On Tuesday he said he believed the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine "will not be the only vaccine" against Covid-19, noting that a number of Phase 3 vaccine trials are ongoing.

Sahin also said BioNTech's goal, in cooperation with Pfizer, is to ramp up production of their vaccine candidate and that they hope to manufacture up to 1.3 billion doses by the end of 2021, if it receives authorization.

He reiterated that BioNTech and Pfizer plan to ask the US Food and Drug Administration to authorize emergency use of the vaccine, with that request coming perhaps as early as next week.

Kara Fox and Frederik Pleitgen

27.8.20

Did Pangolin Trafficking Cause the Coronavirus Pandemic?


The elusive animals’ possible involvement in the origins of COVID-19 gives them a weird ambivalence: threatened and, perhaps, dangerous.

The town of Yokadouma lies in remote eastern Cameroon, close to the border with the Central African Republic, at a juncture of narrow roads that—when I visited, in May, 2010, near the end of the long dry season—were unpaved and parched, their laterite clay pounded to powder by logging trucks rumbling north from the Republic of the Congo. The town’s name translates as Standing Elephant, and in the central roundabout stood an elephant statue, its tusks and part of its trunk broken off, rebar protruding. I checked in to the Hotel Elephant, whose dining room had a gorilla skull hung on one wall, a python skin stretched beside it. I remember the place because it was here, on the following morning, that I met my first pangolin, which was also my last.

A young man from the kitchen staff had just brought this piteous creature back from the town market. He carried it by its tail as it dangled, groggy and helpless. It was reddish brown, like the roadside trees, and for the same reason—it was caked with dust. The scales covering its head, body, and tail looked like rusty metal feathers. Pangolins are amazing animals, loosely known as scaly anteaters because of their armored skin and their diet, their elongated heads and their toothless mouths, though they aren’t closely related to true anteaters. In fact, they constitute a group of their own, one of the oddest of mammalian orders, the Pholidota, which contains only eight living species (the order of bats comprises fourteen hundred species). They are similar to carnivores by descent, and to armadillos by convergent evolution. They eat termites as well as ants, but they are virtually incapable of harming any other form of living creature, except in their own defense.

The kitchen worker dipped this one into a storm sewer to revive it, then let it walk a few steps. Its snout was pointy, essentially an aiming device for its long, noodle-like tongue. Its eyes were dark little beads, shiny but uncomprehending. Its belly, unprotected by scales, was a pale-cream color. This was a white-bellied pangolin, one of four African species, three of which are native to southern Cameroon. It tried to hide, pushing its head into a small hole in the ground near the wall. But even with its sizable front claws, and the strength and instincts of a burrower, it had no chance of digging its way to safety. What will you do with it? I asked the young man. It would be eaten, he said. Pangolin is commonly consumed in Cameroon, as in many different parts of Central Africa and also in Asia, where the other four species are native.

They are elusive creatures, seldom seen even by those who spend considerable time walking in African forests. In 1999 and 2000, J. Michael Fay, an American ecologist and conservationist, made an epic foot journey, with the support of Congolese and Gabonese field crews: four hundred and fifty-six days through the last great intact forests of Central Africa, trekking a zigzag course from the northeast corner of the Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic Ocean, fording rivers, mucking across swamps, tunnelling by machete through trackless thickets, and sometimes strolling easily along elephant trails beneath closed forest canopy. Pausing every twenty paces or so, he recorded methodical notes and calibrations in his Rite in the Rain notebooks on every manner of biological observation. Through the length of his expedition, Fay saw one pangolin. I happened to be with him that day, but I missed it.

Yet pangolins are disastrously susceptible to capture by humans. When they are attacked or challenged, their default mode of defense is to roll into a ball, like a pill bug, scales on the outside, tender parts within. The name pangolin comes from peng-goling, which in Malay means “roller” or “that which rolls up.” This defense works well against such predators as lions and leopards but not against one with a brain and a pair of hands, capable of battering a pangolin open or carrying it back to a village.

Pangolins are also susceptible to coronaviruses, and that trait has given them an unexpected role in the mystery of how sars-CoV-2, the covid-19 virus, found its way into people. Sampling of tissues from dead pangolins has shown that some carry viruses very similar to sars-CoV-2. Did a population of these animals serve as intermediate hosts, within which a bat virus lived briefly—or maybe for some decades, acquiring adaptations that could make it devastating to humans? The evidence is complicated. And the question is only more charged given that all eight pangolin species are presently being pushed toward extinction. Their possible involvement in the covid-19 story gives them a weird ambivalence, endangered and (perhaps) dangerous. Even as so many humans suffer and die, it’s worth asking the pangolin question: has our hunger for these humble creatures got us into a global catastrophe?

Pangolins are solitary animals, each one foraging on its lonesome, the adults coming together briefly to breed. The female carries her single offspring piggyback for some months, and sleeps with it curled tenderly within her armor. Although pangolins are hard to find, they must have once seemed endlessly abundant. Between 1975 and 2000, according to the German biologist Sarah Heinrich and her colleagues, drawing on the database of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (a multinational compact known as cites), roughly seven hundred and seventy-six thousand pangolins became merchandise that was traded legally on the international market. That flow of products included almost six hundred and thirteen thousand pangolin skins, exported from countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Pangolin scales are a separate commodity, highly valued in some cultures for their supposed efficacy in traditional medicines. Between 1994 and 2000, almost nineteen tons of pangolin scales (accounting for roughly forty-seven thousand pangolins) were exported from Malaysia for use in traditional Chinese medicine (T.C.M.) in China and Hong Kong. Chinese tradition, as inscribed in old texts, holds that pangolin scales, ground to powder or burned to ash, can be useful against ant bites, midnight hysterias, evil spirits, malaria, hemorrhoids, and pinworm, and for stimulating lactation in women. Science doesn’t support these claims—the scales consist merely of keratin, the same material as your hair and your nails.

“There’s a lot of finger-pointing at other cultures,” Sarah Heinrich said recently from her home near Potsdam. The finger could point in many directions. Most of the pangolin skins exported between 1975 and 2000 went to North America, where they were turned into handbags, belts, wallets, and fancy cowboy boots. Pangolin leather was especially prized because the animal’s skin bears an eye-catching, almost reptilian, diamond-grid pattern. The Lucchese boot company, bootmaker to Lyndon Johnson, among others, produced pangolin-leather boots before 2000, when cites set the export quota for wild-caught Asian pangolins to zero, essentially making the international commerce illegal.

By then, the pangolin populations in China and parts of Southeast Asia had been drastically depleted, not just to make American cowboy boots but also for regional consumption. At one point, some hundred and fifty thousand pangolins in China went to the knife monthly, their meat eaten and their scales used in T.C.M. “Such was the magnitude of this exploitation,” the Oxford University-based pangolin expert Daniel Challender and three co-authors wrote, “that it apparently led to the commercial extinction of pangolins in China by the mid-nineteen-nineties.” Importing pangolins was more practical than hunting down the few indigenous ones that remained.

Challender did some of his doctoral field work in Vietnam, conducting market surveys, gathering price data on pangolin scales, visiting restaurants where the meat was served. “If you go into a restaurant in Ho Chi Minh City,” he told me, “you’re going to be paying three hundred and fifty dollars a kilo for a pangolin.” It might be grilled, or boiled in a hot pot with ginger and spring onions. He recalled sitting in a restaurant, in 2012, watching three diners enjoy a seven-hundred-dollar pangolin meal. A server carried the animal, alive, into the restaurant in an old sack. It was balled up in its defense posture, showing only scales and claws. “They took out a large rolling pin and clubbed it unconscious,” Challender said. Then “they took some scissors and used the scissor blades to cut the throat.” The blood was drained out and mixed with alcohol for the diners, and the flesh was cooked.

As the Asian populations declined, African pangolins began flowing east in large quantities. Since early times, many peoples of sub-Saharan Africa have “harvested” pangolins, trapping the animals with snares, tracking them with dogs, or coming across them in the forest. The hunters traditionally consumed their catch or sold it into local bush-meat markets. Eventually, the meat became popular in cities, too, such as Libreville, in Gabon, and Yaoundé, in Cameroon, and that led to rising prices around the start of the twenty-first century. The scales mostly moved through the ports and airports of Nigeria and Cameroon to Asia, especially China and Vietnam.

“I know we’re serving as a transit point,” Olajumoke Morenikeji told me recently. She’s a zoologist, and a founder of the Pangolin Conservation Guild Nigeria. To judge from the thousands of kilograms of scales seized, she said, “you can’t have all that just coming from Nigeria.”

Luc Evouna Embolo, an officer for traffic, an international network that monitors the wildlife trade, gave a similar account from Yaoundé. Increasingly, middlemen incite local people to collect pangolins from the field and sell to them. The middlemen sell to urban businessmen who illegally export the animals. A villager might get paid three thousand C.F.A. francs (roughly five dollars) for a pangolin that will be worth thirty dollars in Douala, Cameroon’s economic capital, and much more in China. In 2017, police made one seizure amounting to more than five tons of scales, for which two Chinese traffickers were arrested.



In late 2016, cites had decided to make all international trade of wild-caught pangolins and their parts illegal, but the traffic continued. Its scope could now be gauged only from the fraction seized by customs officials and other national enforcement authorities or detected by non-governmental investigators. By one estimate, almost nine hundred thousand pangolins have been smuggled during the past two decades. Some were alive. Some were dead, peeled of scales and frozen gray. The scales were concealed in sacks or boxes within shipping containers, sometimes labelled as cashews, oyster shells, or scrap plastic. Those who track this commerce, such as Challender and Heinrich, say that pangolins seem to be the most heavily trafficked wild mammals in the world.

There is a vogue in urban China for ye wei, or “wild tastes”—wildlife meat, supposedly imbued with healthful, invigorating properties. Some consumers cherish the notion that eating pangolin is a revered national tradition. But that notion has lately been challenged. Earlier this year, a Chinese journalist named Wufei Yu published an Op-Ed in the Times highlighting old texts that advise against consuming the flesh of certain wild animals, notably snakes, badgers, and pangolins. Yu found that in 652, during the Tang dynasty, an alchemist named Sun Simiao warned about “lurking ailments in our stomachs. Don’t eat the meat of pangolins, because it may trigger them and harm us.” A millennium later, in a compendium of medical and herbal lore now considered foundational to T.C.M., the physician Li Shizhen cautioned that eating pangolin could lead to diarrhea, fever, and convulsions. Pangolin scales could be useful for medicines, Li Shizhen allowed, but beware the meat.

Zhou Jinfeng, a noted conservationist who heads the China Biodiversity Conservation and Green Development Foundation, in Beijing, added a caustic dismissal. “It’s not a matter of tradition,” he told me by Skype. “It’s a matter of money.”

And now, along with the traffic of pangolins into China, a new concern has arisen: the traffic of certain viruses. There was an unheeded signal last year. On March 24, 2019, the Guangdong Wildlife Rescue Center, in Guangzhou, took custody of twenty-one live Sunda pangolins that had been seized by customs police. Most of the animals were in bad health, with skin eruptions and in respiratory distress; sixteen died. Necropsies showed a pattern of swollen lungs containing frothy fluid, and in some cases a swollen liver and spleen. A trio of scientists based at a Guangzhou governmental laboratory and at the Guangzhou Zoo, led by Jin-Ping Chen, took tissue samples from eleven of the animals and searched for genomic evidence of viruses. They found signs of Sendai virus, harmless to people but known for causing illness in rodents. They also found fragments of coronaviruses, a family high on the watch list of viruses potentially dangerous to humans. Still, this was not big news when the Chen group published its report, on October 24th. The scientists noted that either Sendai or a coronavirus might have killed these pangolins, that further study could help with pangolin conservation, and that such viruses might be capable of crossing into other mammals.

Three months later, the word “coronavirus” carried a different ring. An initial small cluster of “abnormal pneumonia” cases had appeared in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province; soon the number had exploded to thousands, and the city was in lockdown; Chinese sources had revealed that a “novel coronavirus” was the cause of this disease; the first genome had been sequenced and released, by a Chinese team led by Yong-Zhen Zhang, of Fudan University, and with one Western partner, Edward C. Holmes, who arranged to make the sequence public on a Web site called Virological, run by a colleague at the University of Edinburgh; cases had started turning up elsewhere, including South Korea, Singapore, and the United States; the World Health Organization had declared a global health emergency; and everyone was now watching. Scientists who understand zoonotic diseases—the diseases caused by pathogens that pass from nonhuman animals into humans—had begun asking, Which animal was the source? Everything comes from somewhere, and novel viruses come to people from wildlife, sometimes through an intermediary animal that may or may not be wild.

Bats were prime suspects, because the sars virus that surfaced in 2002—highly lethal and transmissible, but quickly contained by the middle of 2003—had been a coronavirus hosted by bats. The mers virus, which emerged on the Arabian Peninsula in 2012, even more lethal but less transmissible than sars-CoV (as that first virus became known), was also a coronavirus traceable to bats, though in that case the bat virus had established itself in camels for some decades before spilling over into humans. Another notion about the new virus’s host was snakes—a suggestion made in late January, 2020, based on tenuous evidence, and quickly dismissed.

The attention swung back to bats on February 3rd, when a group led by Zheng-Li Shi, of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, presented genomic data showing a close similarity between the new virus and a coronavirus sequence they had found, half a dozen years earlier, among horseshoe bats in a mine shaft in Yunnan Province, a thousand miles southwest of Wuhan. The genome of this bat virus, now called RaTG13, was 96.2 per cent identical to the new human coronavirus. This was strong evidence that the new virus originally came from bats, but a four-per-cent difference between the genomes was far from a perfect match. Four per cent, in fact, implies decades of evolutionary divergence. Where had the new virus spent that time—in what population of bats or other animals—and how had it spilled from one of them into its first human host? With those questions pending, another candidate for the intermediary emerged. On February 7th, the president of South China Agricultural University, in Guangzhou, declared at a press conference that a team from her institution, in work not yet published, had found what may be an intermediate host of the virus, bridging the gap between bats and humans: pangolins. According to a report by Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, the pangolin virus that the researchers had investigated was a ninety-nine-per-cent match with the coronavirus showing up in people.

The announcement was an overstatement of what the researchers had found, but it caused a flurry of headlines. Even the cites secretariat, based in Geneva, echoed the claim, tweeting the next day that “#Pangolins may have spread #coronavirus to humans,” and sugaring that sour tweet with video footage of cute pangolins—one of them a female with a juvenile on her back—climbing tree branches and snooping for ants. The implication was: these adorable animals carry lethal viruses, so best to leave them alone. When the study from South China Ag. went online, the big result was not quite as big as advertised, though it was still dramatic. The coronavirus genome that these researchers had assembled, from pangolin lung-tissue samples, contained some gene regions that were ninety-nine per cent similar to equivalent parts of the sars-CoV-2 genome—but the over-all match wasn’t that close. Maybe two coronaviruses had merged in a single animal, the researchers wrote, and swapped sections of their genomes—a “recombination event.” Such an event may even have proved fateful, by patching one genomic section of a pangolin coronavirus together with a bat coronavirus. That section, known as the receptor binding domain (R.B.D.), endowed the composite virus with an extraordinary capacity to seize and infect certain human cells, including some in the respiratory tract.

The South China Ag. team got its samples from pangolins at the Guangdong rescue center, some of which had previously been sampled by Jin-Ping Chen’s group. The team’s study, of which Yongyi Shen was a senior author, gave vividness to a technical report when it noted that the rescued pangolins “gradually showed signs of respiratory disease, including shortness of breath, emaciation, lack of appetite, inactivity, and crying.” Pangolins are sensitive, hard to keep alive in captivity even under solicitous care; the harsh conditions of being trafficked internationally would make them especially susceptible to infection. But what killed those sixteen pangolins? Was it Sendai virus, or a coronavirus, or some other cause unrelated to concerns about human health? We’ll probably never know. Later in the paper, buried in a section on methodology, Shen and his co-authors added that the animals “were mostly inactive and sobbing, and eventually died in custody despite exhausting rescue efforts.” Sobbing might be taken as a metaphor for respiratory struggle, but, then again, sometimes a sob is just a sob.

On that morning in southeastern Cameroon, I left the doomed pangolin at the hotel—I knew I couldn’t save it except temporarily, and to salve my own conscience, by trying to buy it—and walked across Yokadouma to the local headquarters of the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife. In a conference room there, I met with the chief of the wildlife section, Apollinaire Otto Mbala, and several other officers, including Achille Mengamenya, the conservator of the nearby Boumba Bek National Park, who wore a military-style uniform with a thick belt and shoulder boards. We talked about legal hunting (for animals such as duikers, small forest antelopes), illegal hunting (for gorillas and chimpanzees), and the status of elephants (they could sometimes, in some areas, be fair game). When bush meat was confiscated, Mbala told me, it was auctioned, the proceeds going into ministry coffers. We also discussed aids, a severe problem in the region and my reason for coming to southeastern Cameroon: to investigate the connection between wildlife as food and the emergence of that disease.

Humans are especially susceptible to viruses from our closest evolutionary kin, and I was interested in the passage of a certain chimpanzee virus into its first human host. Back at the Hotel Elephant, I had a journal paper, much annotated during my rereadings, by a group led by Beatrice H. Hahn, then of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, that cast light on the geographic origin of the aids pandemic. Hahn and her colleagues pioneered a technique of extracting viral genomic evidence from chimpanzee fecal samples and, by comparing those data with H.I.V. genomes, had located the chimpanzee population from which a simian virus (now called sivcpz) spilled from a single chimp into a single human, with catastrophic results for tens of millions of people. The spillover evidently occurred in the extreme southeastern corner of Cameroon. Many chimps across Africa are infected with variants of the sivcpz virus. But those in southeastern Cameroon carry what seems to have become the exact pandemic strain of the aids virus. How had the spillover happened? Possibly during an act of butchery, after the human had snared or speared the chimp; at that point, a cut on the human’s hand or arm could have allowed blood-to-blood transfer of the virus. This scenario was speculative, and it came to be known as the cut-hunter hypothesis.

Mbala turned his laptop to show me a photo of a dead gorilla, killed six months earlier, not far from the national park. The poacher had escaped. What happened to the gorilla’s body? I asked. Mbala hesitated uncomfortably, then said that it had been auctioned: “The locals will eat it. It is meat, after all. It’s very valuable.”

Chimpanzees are valued similarly. From an officer of a conservation group in Yokadouma, I heard about a circumcision ceremony called beka, practiced by the Bakwele people of the region, for initiating a young boy into manhood. He said that it involves an all-night vigil, continuous drumming, certain drugs to keep the boy awake, a bath at dawn, then a day of walking, and finally the crescendo, when a masked officiant cuts off the boy’s foreskin. Traditionally, beka also required the amputated arms of a chimpanzee, to be eaten by village elders. Recently, the Bakwele had shifted to gorilla arms, the officer told me, because of availability. “Chimps are becoming more and more scarce.”

Two days later, I accompanied Mengamenya, the conservator, on an anti-poaching sweep through Boumba Bek National Park. We crossed the Boumba River by dugout canoe, bushwhacked through the forest, counted gorilla nests, waded along waist-deep channels, followed muddy trails potholed with elephant footprints, and looked for signs of people who shouldn’t be there. We found an abandoned poachers’ camp, with three thatched-roof shelters, a fish-drying rack (beneath which a fire still smoldered), and a small bag of reya chips, a traditional poison made from the seeds of a vine. At the tip of an arrow, it would work against monkeys and other small game, Mengamenya explained, and he ordered the camp burned.



We slept on the riverbank and continued the next day. As we walked, Mengamenya answered my questions about traditional hunting in this part of Cameroon. The reya poison, for instance: a hunter would grind it to powder, apply it to crossbow arrows, shoot a monkey, then follow the animal for half an hour until it fell, helpless, out of a tree. Hunting gorillas required dogs, many men, and a chaotic process of surrounding a big ape and then spearing it. (Hunting with rifles or shotguns was easier, of course, but many local people couldn’t afford them, and we had seen no spent ammunition.) Chimpanzees were generally taken with snares, and the dangerous moment was when a hunter closed in on that tethered, frantic, enraged animal to finish it with a spear. “Il y en avait beaucoup d’accidents de chasse,” Mengamenya said. Lots of hunters got hurt. Chimpanzees are powerful, and they bite. It reminded me of the hypothetical cut hunter. A moment of bloody contact could yield many bad outcomes, one of which was infection with a new virus.

This answered the question that had brought me to southeastern Cameroon: Yes, the hunting and eating of chimps and gorillas continues. And, as long as it does, humanity stands in jeopardy of another spillover the likes of H.I.V. But, of course, subsequent events have shown, too, that apes aren’t the only animals hosting viruses to which humans may be catastrophically susceptible.

Stories, in our connected era, spread even more quickly than viruses. One story of covid-19 that spread early and widely was that the outbreak had begun among people associated with the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, in Wuhan. It was a wet market, where venders offered wildlife for eating—from civets to wolf pups, porcupines, and snakes—as well as seafood, domestic meat, and other perishable food items. (Pangolins would have been traded less openly.) The market was shut down on January 1st, in response to the “abnormal pneumonia” outbreak, and scientists took samples in search of what they may have suspected—but no one had yet declared publicly—was a novel coronavirus. Then the market was promptly cleaned by a team of masked, white-clad workers spraying sanitizer. The coronavirus was found—genomic bits, plus a touch of viable virus that could be grown in a lab—but it came from wastewater or door handles or other surfaces, not from wild animals. If any live animals caged at Huanan were tested for the coronavirus, those results have never been announced.

A later review of the first forty-one hospitalized patients clarified that most, but not all, of them had been exposed to the market. Some—including the earliest patient, whose symptoms began on December 1, 2019—had no known contact with Huanan. This suggests that the coronavirus was already circulating among people in the city as early as November, and that an infected person—not an infected wild animal—may have carried it into the market.

The first human victim probably did get infected from a wild animal. But it’s unknown whether that animal was a bat or a pangolin or something else, or whether it was in a cage on its way to Wuhan, or maybe living in the wild, defecating on somebody’s vegetable garden.

As the pandemic took hold, the Chinese government enacted several measures against the sort of commerce that made wet markets notorious. On February 24th, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s highest legislative body, adopted a ban on selling or eating wild animals. On June 5th, pangolins native to China were upgraded to the highest level of wildlife protection. Days later, word leaked that pangolin scales would be removed from the “Chinese Pharmacopoeia,” the official compendium of T.C.M.

Uncertainty over the origins of the virus continued. At least three more scientific papers on the subject appeared between February and May, two from Chinese teams and one from a group at the Baylor College of Medicine, in Houston. All three based their analyses, as had Yongyi Shen’s group at South China Ag., on genomic data from pangolins at the rescue center in Guangdong. One group reported that pangolins seem to carry a coronavirus so similar to sars-CoV-2 that it might be the source of the pandemic. Part of their evidence was that crucial section of the pangolin coronavirus genome, the receptor binding domain, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the R.B.D. in the pandemic virus. Another group said, No, our analyses do not support the idea that the pandemic virus came directly from a pangolin. The third group, posting their report as a preprint, before peer review, agreed with Yongyi Shen: this sars virus looks as though it could be the result of a recombination event—a switching of genome segments in the body of one animal—or maybe several such events, accidentally combining genes from bat viruses, pangolin viruses, and even other viruses to become the extremely well-adapted virus causing the nightmare of covid-19.

There’s also a possibility that the viruses carried by smuggled pangolins do not reflect the typical viral burden of wild pangolins. They might not really be pangolin viruses at all, but infections acquired from other wild animals under the conditions of the trafficking chain—stress caused by shortage of food and water and oxygen, human handling, temperatures too hot or too cold, close confinement in cages adjacent to various doomed creatures. That could explain the respiratory symptoms: pangolins, unlike bats, may be unaccustomed to these viruses. One group of scientists looked at pangolins near the supply end of the trade flowing toward China, collecting throat and rectal swabs from three hundred and thirty-four Sunda pangolins in Peninsular Malaysia and the state of Sabah (Malaysian Borneo) that had either been seized from smugglers, or otherwise rescued, between 2009 and 2019. Not one sample tested positive for a coronavirus.

The scientific discussion of the pandemic’s origins is still in kaleidoscopic flux. Among even just the hypotheses for which empirical evidence exists—ignoring the nutcase theories, the unsupported slanders, and the paranoid speculations purveyed online—ideas vary, and some sets of data conflict with others. Journal papers are appearing faster than ever, many of them posted, before peer review, on such “preprint” Web sites as bioRxiv, hosted by the well-respected Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, on Long Island. Others get peer-reviewed quickly, because of their urgency, and go online under the aegis of eminent journals including Nature, Cell, and The Lancet. Still another paper, published this spring by Nature, examined samples from a different batch of rescued pangolins—from Guangxi Province—as well as genomic evidence from the much studied Guangdong pangolins. These scientists found two distinct lineages of coronavirus closely related to sars-CoV-2.

Two coronaviruses, both resembling our nemesis bug? It seemed to suggest that pangolins are brimming with invisible menace. The first author on the Nature paper was Tommy Tsan-Yuk Lam; the senior author was a famed virus hunter in Hong Kong, Yi Guan; and among the other authors was Edward C. Holmes, who brokered the release of the first sars-CoV-2 genome. So I asked Holmes, by Skype, for illumination.

Edward C. Holmes is a brilliant evolutionary biologist, the author of an authoritative book, from 2009, titled “The Evolution and Emergence of RNA Viruses” (they are the fastest-evolving and most dangerous kinds of virus, and include the coronaviruses). Born in England, Holmes is now a professor at the University of Sydney, with close connections to colleagues in China. He has a quick wit and a perfectly round, bald head. His friends and his Twitter followers know him as Eddie. When I first met him, ten years ago, at Penn State, where he worked at the time, his office was decorated with a poster depicting Bart Simpson in a cartoon version of “Nighthawks,” the Edward Hopper painting. Why Bart Simpson? I asked. Because he looks like me, Holmes said.

“In February, I get contacted by Tommy Lam,” he told me now. Lam, a former postdoctoral fellow of Holmes’s, was working in Hong Kong with Yi Guan. Lam explained that he and Guan had obtained viral genome sequences from pangolins confiscated by customs authorities in two different provinces—not just the rescue-center ones but also some seized during 2017 and 2018 in Guangxi Province, which shares a border with Vietnam and therefore lies along a pangolin-trafficking route. Two things were notable about the animals, Lam told Holmes: “They’ve got this respiratory disease. And guess what. They’ve got, like, this coronavirus in them.” Another coronavirus, not a familiar one, but also resembling sars-CoV-2. Holmes told me, “I thought, Well, that’s extraordinary.”

Holmes signed on to assist with his specialty, analyzing genomic data. What surprised him was not just that two distinct groups of pangolins both carried coronavirus infections, or that both viruses were similar to the human virus, but that they were distinct from each other. “That’s what is so striking,” he said. “There are two lineages, and the Guangdong ones are closer to sars-CoV-2 than the Guangxi ones. But they’re both close. Right? So it’s not that there’s one outbreak in pangolins.” Two distinct coronaviruses, each similar to sars-CoV-2, one with a receptor binding domain to which human-lung cells are highly susceptible, had travelled into southern China in smuggled pangolins.

“What are the odds?” Holmes said. The odds are low. The finding suggests, he added, that there are many more dangerous viruses lurking in pangolins than we have detected so far. But not just in pangolins—don’t forget bats, carrying their own share of coronaviruses, some of which are only a few decades of evolutionary change from having the capacity to infect and kill humans. And not just bats. What other animals may have played a role during that stretch of missing decades, which he called the evolutionary gap? “What’s in the gap?” he asked. “I don’t know. Raccoon dogs?” Raccoon dogs are tree-climbing canids with black masks, native to East Asia and also sold as food. “Bamboo rats?” Confession: I’ve eaten those, in China, myself. “Who the hell knows?” Holmes said. “But until we go there and sample them we’re never going to know. That’s the critical thing. To resolve the origins.”

More field research is needed, he meant. More sampling of wild animals. More scrutiny of genomes. More cognizance of the fact that animal infections can become human infections, because humans are animals. We live in a world of viruses, and we have scarcely begun to understand this one. 

David Quammen is the author of many books, including “The Song of the Dodo,” “Spillover,” and, most recently, “The Tangled Tree.”

3.8.20

This week marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima

A hundred thousand people were killed by the atomic bomb. Survivors wonder why they lived when so many others died.
Nuclear Remembrance days: 75th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings.

2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the detonation of nuclear bombs during World War II in Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9). There will be official commemoration ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki organised by these cities, was well as actions and events organised by civil society in Japan and around the world.

Due to COVID-19 pandemic, the official ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki will be invite only (to restrict numbers and allow for physical distancing) but can be watched live online. A number of other commemoration events will be run online as video conferences or live-streamed events.

See below for information on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki ceremonies plus other key international commemoration events. For more detailed information see Nuclear Remembrance and Action Week Aug 1-9 2020, which includes international events and suggested nuclear disarmamament actions to commemorate the 75th anniversaries of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


Hiroshima and Nagasaki ceremonies

The official Hiroshima commemoration ceremony will take place on Thursday August 6 from 8:00am-8:50am Japan time. Click here for information on how to watch the ceremony on livestream. The UN Secretary-General is expected to either attend the event or provide a video message if pandemic conditions prevent his attendance. For more information see Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony and Notice regarding Hiroshima Memorial 2020 ceremony procedures in light of COVID-19 pandemic. The official Nagasaki commemoration ceremony will take place on Sunday August 9 from 11am-12pm Japan time. Click here to watch the ceremony on livestream. For more information see Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony


Peace Wave

From August 6 at 8:15am, the time that the nuclear bomb was detonated over Hiroshima, until August 9 at 11:02am, the time the nuclear bomb was detonated over Nagasaki, peace activists around the world will undertake individual and/or group actions as part of a ‘Peace Wave’. You can join the peace wave by undertaking your own small, creative, social media action from home or interesting location, or joining an action in your community. For more information and to register your action, please visit Peace Wave 2020.

International Fast

Every year since 1984, a small group of peace campaigners from France and Germany have fasted from August 6 until 9 in commemoration of the nuclear bombings and to call for the global abolition of nuclear weapons. In recent years, they have been joined by fasters in the Ivory Coast, New Zealand, UK and USA. This year, in the light of the Coronavirus pandemic and its devastating consequences, the fast will also highlight the many millions around the world threatened by malnutrition or famine, while governments continue to spend $100 billion per year on nuclear weapons and $1.9 trillion per year on weapons and war. Participants in the Fast will donate the money they would on food during that time to organizations or charities helping to feed the destitute. You are invited to join the fast. Contact Dominique Lalanne (France) or Marc Morgan (UK).

2020 World Conference against A and H Bombs

Every year Gensuikyo (the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) holds a world conference against A and H Bombs in Japan in conjunction with the commemorations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Days. The theme for the conference this year is “With the Hibakusha, Let Us Achieve a Nuclear Weapon-free, Peaceful and Just World – for the Future of the Humankind and Our Planet” Due to COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 world conference will be held by a series of webinar sessions from August 2 until August 9. There will be three main sessions (2 hours each) on August 2, 6 and 9, plus some additional special sessions. For more information including the draft program see 2020 World Conference on A and H Bombs.

Youth Peace Week and UN International Youth Day

Youth Peace Week is from August 3rd to 9th 2020. Originally established in New Zealand as Schools Peace Week with the support of the New Zealand government, the week spread to other countries. This year it has been broadened to Youth Peace Week as it only suits schools in the Southern Hemisphere (schools in the North are mostly on summer break). The theme this year is Celebrating Diversity. For more information and to register your youth action, see Youth Peace Week, visit the Youth Peace Week facebook page or contact the Youth Peace Week coordinator. Abolition 2000 also encourages those commemorating UN International Youth Day on August 12, to ensure that peace and nuclear disarmament are included as themes to your action or event.

Ribbon 2020 – Tangible hope for No nuclear war

The Ribbon International was founded as an artistic event to commemorate the Hiroshima and Nagasaki anniversaries. On August 4, 1985, fifteen miles of Ribbons encircled the Pentagon and other important monuments: With the message of “What I cannot bear to think of as lost forever in a nuclear war”. The Atomic Bomb Dome in Hiroshima was also encircled. Various other Ribbon events have taken place since then. On August 1st 2020 at 10:00 am (EDT), The Ribbon International will hold a Ribbon 2020 memorial event by Zoom. You are invited to join the event with your friends/family. Hold your Ribbon in front of the Zoom screen, and pray for a nuclear free world. For details see The Ribbon International 2020 event, or contact The Ribbon International

Other events and event Calendars

The above, and other international events are listed on the Abolition 2000 events calendar. National and local events are listed on the FCNL Nuclear Calendar, World Beyond War events calendar and Hiroshima Nagasaki 75 events page (USA), Terminkalender (Germany) and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Events (UK). We encourage you to check these calendars.

30.7.20

The Cold War Bunker That Became Home to a Dark-Web Empire

CyberBunker, a business based near the German resort town of Traben-Trarbach, offered “bulletproof hosting” for Web sites. The air-locked facility, five stories deep, was designed to withstand a nuclear attack.

An eccentric Dutchman began living in a giant underground facility built by the German military and ran a server farm beloved by cybercriminals.

In the mid-nineteen-seventies, the West German Army, the Bundeswehr, built a vast underground bunker near the town of Traben-Trarbach. It was five stories deep, had nearly sixty thousand square feet of floor space, and was designed to withstand a nuclear attack. Eighty days’ worth of survival provisions were stored inside, including an emergency power supply and more than a million litres of drinking water. You entered the facility through an air lock; the interior temperature was set to seventy degrees. The walls were concrete, thirty-one inches thick, and some were lined with copper. The rooms were soundproof and transmission-proof. Between 1978 and 2012, the bunker was the headquarters of the Bundeswehr’s meteorological division, and at any one time about three hundred and fifty civilian contractors worked there; most of them focussed on predicting and plotting weather patterns wherever the German military was deployed. New employees often got lost. On each level, the walls were painted a different color, to help people orient themselves—but the bunker was symmetrical, so one side looked much like another. There was no natural light. In winter, workers on day shifts arrived in the dark and left in the dark.

In 2012, the Bundeswehr moved its meteorological division to another site. Germany’s federal real-estate agency, known as BImA, listed the bunker for three hundred and fifty thousand euros. The low price reflected the unusual nature of the property and the expense of maintaining it. The bunker sat beneath a plot of some thirty acres, in a forested area on a hill outside Traben-Trarbach, which is an hour east of the Belgian border. The perimeter of the property was marked by ramparts and a fence, and aboveground the site contained several large structures, including a gatehouse, an office building, a tall aerial with satellite dishes, a helipad, and barracks constructed by the Nazis in 1933. The Bundeswehr had employed twelve men, who worked in shifts around the clock, solely to insure that the bunker was properly ventilated and did not flood. The German government hoped that a technology business, or perhaps a hotel, might want the premises, but there were few prospective buyers.

The relocation of the Bundeswehr division was a blow to the local economy. Traben-Trarbach is a fairy-tale town that straddles a bend in the wide, teal-blue Mosel River. Traben is on the north bank, Trarbach on the south. The town, which is overlooked by a ruined fourteenth-century castle, is full of aesthetic quirks and highly caloric delicacies. Only about six thousand people live there, but thousands of tourists arrive every summer to hike, drink the local Riesling, and take river cruises. At the turn of the twentieth century, Traben-Trarbach was a wine-trading hub second only to Bordeaux, and also a center of the Jugendstil movement, the German iteration of Art Nouveau; many of its buildings reflect the wealth and the brio of that period. Near the hotel where I stayed in December, a Jugendstil relief of Rapunzel adorned the side of an apartment building. Her gilded hair fell in wavy lines from the fourth floor to the second.

The mayor of Traben-Trarbach, Patrice-Christian-Roger Langer, a garrulous man with a fine gray beard, worked at the bunker complex for nearly thirty years, and for eleven of them he operated its mainframe computer. He enjoyed his time working underground. But, he told me, “not everybody could deal with working in a bunker,” adding, “It’s a mental thing . . . if you don’t have a window.”

In 2012, a foundation controlled by a fifty-three-year-old Dutchman named Herman-Johan Xennt proposed to buy the bunker complex. Xennt travelled to Traben-Trarbach to explain his plans to a closed session of the town council. He was a striking man, with a cascade of shoulder-length gray-blond hair, and wore a dark suit, which highlighted the pallor of his face. Xennt told the council that he intended to set up a Web-hosting business at the bunker complex, and promised to create as many as a hundred jobs for local people, but he was vague when pressed for details.

Several council members were concerned about Xennt’s credentials. Although he said that he had been in the Web-hosting business for years, he did not name any blue-chip clients. But there were no other viable buyers, and so, in June, 2013, the property was sold to Xennt’s foundation. One of the council members, Heide Pönnighaus, later told a newspaper, “I didn’t have the best feeling about it.”

Xennt was born Herman-Johan Verwoert-Derksen, in 1959. He grew up in Arnhem, a small city in the eastern Netherlands which had been the site of intense fighting during the Second World War. As a teen-ager, he became interested in historical buildings, and several times he visited an old Nazi bunker on the edge of town. He also fell in love with science fiction, and began calling himself Xennt (pronounced “Zent”). When “Star Wars” was released, in 1977, he was enraptured by it. He decorated his bedroom to look like a spaceship, with blacked-out windows, jury-rigged electric doors, and speakers playing moody synthesizer music. In one corner of the room was an Apple II personal computer.

By his early twenties, he had officially changed his surname. Nothing irritated him more than being called by his given name, and he preferred to be called by his new surname alone. Even his parents knew him simply as Xennt. After graduating from college, in the early eighties, he started several personal-computer businesses in the Netherlands. A poster for a store that he owned, PC International, shows him with long brown hair, bushy eyebrows, and an unconvincing mustache. He is wearing a T-shirt with “Xennt” printed on it, and is standing behind a bulky monitor emblazoned with the store’s logo. During this period, he and a partner, a woman of Dutch Antillean heritage named Angelique, had two sons. They named them Xyonn and Yennoah: X and Y. Xennt and Angelique soon separated, and she retained primary custody of the boys. (Xennt also has a son who was born in 2019, to a different mother.)

In 1995, when Xennt was thirty-five, he bought a twenty-thousand-square-foot former nato bunker in the Dutch town of Goes, near the North Sea coast. The bunker, built forty-one years earlier, had ceased being used for military purposes in 1994. Xennt settled in with some old friends, including Paul Scheepers, a computer technician with a bald pate, long curly hair, and a sweet laugh. Scheepers is now fifty-eight years old, and works in I.T. support for a Dutch badminton foundation, but he still introduces himself by the online sobriquet that he adopted in the eighties: Cytrax. “We were looking for some space to make a kind of futuristic environment,” Scheepers told me recently. “And what do you do when you have a bunker and you have a computer company? You put computers in the bunker.”

At the Goes property, Xennt started a new business, called CyberBunker, which offered “bulletproof hosting” to Web sites. All Web sites must be physically hosted somewhere, whether on a personal computer or a server; hosting is now a multibillion-dollar industry dominated by such companies as Amazon Web Services and GoDaddy. CyberBunker offered, for a steep price, a highly secure hosting environment for sites containing sensitive, or illicit, material. In the late nineties, most of CyberBunker’s customers ran pornographic sites. Xennt had a liberal outlook, but there were lines he would not cross. According to CyberBunker’s Web site, its servers would host all content except “child pornography and anything related to terrorism.”

I spoke to a former pornography distributor who used Xennt’s servers during this period. (He did not want me to publish his name, as he now works in finance.) He told me that his business brought in about a million euros a year, but that Xennt himself had relatively little money, because he had imprudently bought hundreds of servers—an investment in infrastructure that took several years to pay off.

A curious mixture of adolescent-male fantasia and techno-anarchist utopia, CyberBunker anticipated the current trend for apocalypse-ready hideaways owned by the rich and paranoid. The pornographer visited the Goes facility several times. Xennt’s taste in interior design had changed little since he had decorated his teen-age bedroom: the bunker was furnished with computer terminals, black leather sofas, neon-red lamps, and artificial plants. Ethereal music was often playing. The pornographer found the bunker’s atmosphere strange but “impressive”; its denizens were “alternative” people. Xennt had an odd diet. For breakfast, he ate frikandel—a skinless, deep-fried pork sausage, which is a popular snack in the Netherlands—along with an assortment of vitamins. “Xennt was a mysterious guy,” the pornographer told me, laughing. Two other former colleagues remember that the Goes bunker had a “porno room” where there were sometimes live sex shows involving Xennt’s girlfriends.

In 1999, a young programmer named Sven Kamphuis, who went by the online handle CB3ROB, joined the CyberBunker collective. Kamphuis worked a day job at the Dutch Internet firm XS4ALL. He had unruly black eyebrows and a crazy mop of black hair, and his colleagues at XS4ALL thought that he looked like Bert, from “Sesame Street.” They also remember him as rude, childish, and prone to conspiracy theories. But Kamphuis’s talent for programming was undeniable. He soon became one of Xennt’s lieutenants.

At around the same time, Xennt rented part of the bunker to another group. On July 27, 2002, there was an explosion in that section, and in the fire that ensued Xennt suffered burns on his hands and his face. The police showed up, and in the charred ruins of the bunker they found the remnants of a laboratory for making Ecstasy. Xennt’s business license was taken away, but he was not charged with any crime. He maintained that he had known nothing about the drug factory, and that the subletting group had assured him it was a painting company. CyberBunker’s servers were moved to aboveground facilities, in Amsterdam and elsewhere.

Xennt encouraged the notion that CyberBunker was more than a business. Less than a week after the fire, on August 1, 2002, he and Kamphuis published a declaration of independence for a new state, which they called the Republic of CyberBunker. Citing a U.N. Security Council resolution from 1960, which said that “all people have the right to self-determination,” the Republic of CyberBunker—population six—seceded from the Netherlands. CyberBunker declared as its sovereign territory the five hundred acres containing the ruined bunker. The country’s official currencies would be gold, dollars, and euros, and each resident would pay a flat tax of fifteen thousand dollars a year. Unusually for a republic, it had a royal family. Its President was His Majesty King Xennt von CyberBunker, and its minister of foreign affairs and telecommunications was His Royal Highness Prince Sven Olaf von CyberBunker-Kamphuis.

Kamphuis often acted as CyberBunker’s spokesperson, and he promoted anti-authoritarian, libertarian ideas. Among his tenets: free speech is supreme; everyone has a right to be online; the Internet erases the power of the state; copyright is twentieth-century bullshit. Such notions were in fashion during the nineties, when big technology firms had yet to dominate the Internet. In 1996, John Perry Barlow, the anarchist writer and a founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a group committed to digital freedom and privacy, wrote an influential manifesto that began, “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”

Several people told me that Xennt was not entirely sincere about his self-proclaimed regal status. (He recently called CyberBunker’s declaration of independence “a joke.”) But Kamphuis was serious about it—and remains so. Since 2002, he has more than once claimed to “enjoy personal and functional immunity” when faced with arrest, on charges ranging from driving offenses to cybercrime. Paul Scheepers, Xennt’s longtime friend, told me that Xennt’s world view was more pragmatic than Kamphuis’s: he simply wanted the freedom to pursue his own projects without interference. Xennt declined to be interviewed for this article, but agreed to give written answers to a dozen questions. He explained, “I am not interested in politics at all. I value privacy and I am against the ‘big brother’ policy of large corporations and governments.”

In the nineties and two-thousands, however, Xennt took part in some activism, helping to instigate what became known as the Public Root movement. He and an international group of investors and programmers tried to create their own roster of top-level domains—the suffixes that follow an Internet address, such as “.org,” “.com,” and “.edu.” They came up with various new domains—including “.schiphol,” the name of Amsterdam’s airport, and “.sex”—with the aim of selling them. Top-level domains are controlled by an American nonprofit organization called icann. At a time when the structure of the Internet still seemed to be in flux, Xennt and others in the Public Root movement chafed at icann’s authority. In 2005, Xennt filed a patent application related to top-level domains, writing, “We state that each Internet user has the right to see all of the Internet.”

The Public Root movement eventually fell apart, because of internal arguments over control, funding, and transparency. Martijn Burger, one of Xennt’s former partners in the project, successfully sued Xennt for breach of contract. Burger told me that Public Root was “ideological,” but added, “We also wanted to make some money.”

Burger, who now works in private health care in the Netherlands, told me that Xennt has “brilliant ideas, but he’s not a businessman.” Peter Olsthoorn, a Dutch investigative journalist who has covered Xennt and CyberBunker ever since the Public Root contretemps, said that Xennt was an “old-fashioned anarchist” with a specific gift: he understood “the Internet in its root, in the core.” Scheepers told me that Xennt was an inspired designer who might have worked for Apple had he chosen a different path.

Another former colleague of Xennt’s, a Dutch programmer named Frank Van der Loos, occasionally performed legal work for CyberBunker, despite having only paralegal qualifications. When we met in The Hague in March, Van der Loos wore a Bluetooth earpiece the entire time and spoke so quickly that I frequently misunderstood him. (He often finished his sentences with “Do you understand?”) Van der Loos said that he and Xennt had argued about money, adding that Xennt’s great weakness was that he was a “cheapskate.” But Van der Loos also compared him to Steve Jobs. Although Xennt could code only in the rudimentary language BASIC, he was prescient about the kinds of change that a connected world would bring. Before PayPal became popular, for instance, Xennt had attempted to start his own online encrypted banking-transfer service, named Bank66. It had failed because of Xennt’s greed and lack of business acumen, Van der Loos said. Nevertheless, he called Xennt “a visionary.”

Jörg Angerer, a senior German prosecutor, first heard that Xennt’s foundation had bought the Traben-Trarbach bunker in the summer of 2013, after a council member conveyed his concerns to the local police. Angerer, who is based in Koblenz, an hour northeast of Traben-Trarbach, is a lean and affable man with a shaved head and an unshaven face. For the past few years, his office has specialized in prosecuting cybercrime. Soon after he began researching Xennt and his company, he told me, he concluded that some of CyberBunker’s clients were manifestly illegal. But CyberBunker itself appeared to exist in a gray area between activism, business, and criminality.

In the two-thousands and twenty-tens, CyberBunker and Kamphuis’s associated Internet-service provider, which was also called CB3ROB, had become notorious for hosting the spam e-mail operations of phishing sites—fraudulent criminal enterprises that lure people into disclosing their credit-card details—and of rogue pharmaceutical peddlers. At the same time, CyberBunker hosted WikiLeaks, the renegade operation devoted to exposing secret documents. (Xennt told me that this was not a political gesture on his part: “CyberBunker hosted WikiLeaks indeed. Why? Because WikiLeaks hired its services.”) The Pirate Bay, a site for sharing movies and other copyrighted content, was a CyberBunker client until 2010, when the Motion Picture Association of America won a court ruling, in Hamburg, that forced Xennt and Kamphuis to remove the site from its servers. Kamphuis was indignant about the decision, telling a reporter, “Help us put these dinosaurs out of their misery!”

As Angerer continued to research CyberBunker, he learned that it could be very aggressive. Around 2010, the Spamhaus Project, a European volunteer-driven organization whose goal is to impede spammers, had begun listing I.P. and real addresses associated with CyberBunker and CB3ROB, and had lobbied Internet-service providers to block the company. In early 2013, this pressure led to CB3ROB’s services being briefly taken off-line. In retaliation, Kamphuis and a loose group of hackers in different countries, who called themselves the Stophaus Collective, hit Spamhaus with a distributed denial-of-service attack, which incapacitates a site by overloading it with traffic. Kamphuis was arrested shortly after the attack, but Xennt was not; he proceeded with moving into the Traben-Trarbach bunker.

Angerer told me that he didn’t fully understand Xennt’s acquisition of the property, except to say that he evidently had “a weak spot for bunkers.” CyberBunker gained some mystique by operating out of a fortified underground facility, but there is little benefit for customers in physically protecting servers to such an extreme degree. Moreover, the ostentatiously secure location was bound to attract the suspicion of law enforcement. Xennt’s promise of bulletproof hosting, Angerer suggested, could have been more effectively fulfilled by using regular servers in a more permissive jurisdiction, such as Russia.

Xennt’s desire to live and work underground was not entirely rational. Van der Loos, the former associate, told me that Xennt was bunkergeil—a Dutch portmanteau that means “horny for bunkers.” After the underground facility in the Netherlands was destroyed by fire, in 2002, Xennt concluded that the most likely country where he might find a replacement was Germany, which had many military hideouts from the Cold War era. In 2007, Van der Loos and Xennt visited a former nato bunker in Börfink, a facility that had been used as a center for West German intelligence in the seventies and eighties. In some areas of the Börfink bunker, there were no lights, and so the two men toured the cavernous space in darkness, following fluorescent green arrows on the walls, like Egyptologists inspecting hieroglyphs. The biggest underground room, which had formerly housed nato maps, was three stories high. Xennt was captivated. “I want to be buried here,” he said. Van der Loos spent the night in a nearby hotel, but Xennt made a bed in the abandoned map room and slept there.

CyberBunker, a business based near the German resort town of Traben-Trarbach, offered “bulletproof hosting” for Web sites. The air-locked facility, five stories deep, was designed to withstand a nuclear attack.Photo illustration by Max Guther


Xennt moved into the Traben-Trarbach bunker in June, 2013. Angerer kept an eye on Xennt’s activities but did not authorize a full investigation of CyberBunker for more than a year. The inquiry presented many legal difficulties. According to German legislation, it’s lawful to host a Web site containing illicit material, as long as the hoster is unaware of the content and does not actively assist the site’s owner in illegal behavior. Online privacy is an important principle in German law, and establishing that a hoster knows of or assists in the publishing of illicit content normally requires a communication tap, which a judge is unlikely to permit without prima-facie evidence of criminality. Before Xennt moved to Traben-Trarbach, no Web hoster in Germany had ever been successfully prosecuted.

Michel van Eeten, a Dutch professor of cybercrime at Delft University of Technology, recently helped the Dutch police in an investigation of another “bulletproof hoster,” called MaxiDed. The Netherlands has laws similar to Germany’s on such matters, and van Eeten told me that investigators were left in “a Catch-22”: “We don’t have the power to show that the hosters are actively facilitating crime, and so we don’t have the power to actually collect the data.” Van Eeten told me that the MaxiDed case, which was tried last year, turned on a piece of luck. A separate Dutch investigation of a child-abuse site revealed that it was owned by the same people who owned MaxiDed. The judge in the MaxiDed case then allowed some digital intercepts. In one e-mail exchange, which I have seen, a customer complained that his server had been shut down for “abuse” even though he had paid a premium for permission to host “adult, erotic, movies, doorways, dating, vpn, blogs, xrumer, and zennoposter.” (A “doorway” page is a means of manipulating search engines; XRumer and ZennoPoster are tools for spreading spam.) The MaxiDed representative asked the customer what he had been running on his server. The customer responded, “xrumer.” The MaxiDed representative said, “OK. Proceed.” The customer then acknowledged that he had also used the server as a command-and-control center for denial-of-service attacks. The hoster replied, “Done . . . should be up in a few minutes.”

Despite this damning evidence, the MaxiDed case was not easy to prosecute. The company was shut down and two of its administrators were arrested. One was tried in the Netherlands but was convicted only on a single count of money laundering. On all other counts, the prosecutors failed to show that MaxiDed had been a knowing accessory to crime. “The case sort of fell apart,” van Eeten told me.

Angerer, the German prosecutor, knew that if he was going to bring down CyberBunker he needed both analog and digital evidence of wrongdoing. After Xennt set up shop in Germany, local police officers started monitoring the property, though they could not see much, because Xennt had added taller fencing to the ramparts, and dogs to guard the perimeter. The officers also enlisted someone connected to CyberBunker as an informant. At the start of 2015, a German cybercrime unit based in the city of Mainz began investigating Xennt’s activities.

In December, I travelled to Mainz, which is about an hour east of Traben-Trarbach, and met with the cybercrime team. Three police officers and two civilian contractors worked out of a crowded room in a quiet area of the city. The unit’s headquarters had the ambience of a nerdy frat house. Decorating one wall was a “Breaking Bad” poster featuring the show’s antihero, Walter White—a disgruntled chemistry teacher who begins cooking enormous quantities of meth in a high-tech bunker. The officers asked that I not use their names, but they were happy to discuss their five-year investigation of CyberBunker. None of the men looked old enough to have been doing anything professional for half a decade.

The police officers told me that, later in 2015, German authorities granted them permission to intercept the bunker’s Web traffic. The officers tapped a cable going into the facility; the inflow and outflow were “mirrored,” or copied, but not stopped. A small portion of the information they captured—around ten or fifteen per cent—was unencrypted. On that “clear” portion, the police could see links to illegal Web pages that sold drugs, facilitated credit-card fraud, and conducted other scams. Although the police could not decode any of the encrypted data, the size of the flow suggested that CyberBunker was offering bulletproof protection for a huge number of so-called dark-Web sites. Xennt, in other words, was hosting illicit marketplaces.

Most people use only a fraction of the Internet. A small percentage of Web content is accessed through search engines like Google, or discussion sites like Reddit, or news sites like cnn.com. Beneath the “clear” Web that most people use is a vast amount of non-searchable and password-protected content, including government reports, scientific material, and medical records. This section of the Internet is known as the deep Web. Beneath this level is the dark Web, which exists largely on Tor—software that allows users to communicate with one another without betraying their identities or their I.P. addresses.

Tor is based on technology developed in the mid-nineties by employees of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, with the intention of protecting online communications. (Tor is still partly funded by the U.S. government.) The first working version of the software was launched in 2002. Tor’s premise is simple and elegant. The Internet works by sending packets of information from one computer to another. The Tor browser routes all traffic through a network of relay nodes, in such a way that the starting point cannot be detected by the destination. As data pass through each of the relays, encryption is stripped away like the layers of an onion. Tor is an abbreviation of “the onion router.”

In repressive states, the dark Web has become a haven for political activists. Many journalists use Tor to send and receive information securely, or to communicate with sources. Some users like the fact that dark-Web pages are not subject to the same censorship as the regular Web, where there are limits on what you can say. Other users appreciate Tor because they can avoid offering up their private data to such giant corporations as Google and Facebook. Some legitimate news outlets, including the Times and ProPublica, maintain onion-router pages.

Yet a 2016 study by researchers at King’s College London found that sixty per cent of Tor sites contain illicit material. Between 2011 and 2013, the first truly successful dark-Web bazaar, the Silk Road, processed hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of illegal drug transactions. The site, modelled on Amazon or eBay, used the U.S. Postal Service to deliver packages. The F.B.I. eventually closed the Silk Road, and its founder, Ross Ulbricht—an American who went by the online moniker Dread Pirate Roberts—is now serving a life sentence in an Arizona prison, without the possibility of parole. Before his arrest, Ulbricht had espoused a libertarian outlook, and had argued that the Silk Road was forging a path toward a world unfettered by repressive governments. Every transaction on his site, Ulbricht wrote to Silk Road users, weakened “the thieving, murderous” state.

It’s easy enough to access Tor. You can download a Tor browser onto a regular computer; or you can run an operating system, funnelled through Tor, from a USB stick plugged into your device. Dark-Web sites look much like the rest of the Internet, but they are generally much more difficult to navigate: you often find yourself scrabbling around like a hiker lost on a trail at night, trying to read a hand-drawn map with a flashlight. If you use a search engine to find a popular dark-Web site, you will see lists of recent links to that site, but some of the links will lead to error messages. Such addresses are characterized by a mess of numbers and letters, which makes memorizing them virtually impossible. (On Tor, the e-mail and chat provider Riseup appears as http://vww6ybal4bd7szmgncyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyyd.onion/.)

I recently spent some time on Dread, a forum accessed through Tor which is a kind of Reddit for the dark Web. In one thread, commenters used assumed names to discuss the selling of illegal drugs in the United Kingdom. They were talking about how the coronavirus outbreak would affect the importation of narcotics. “Would you see any of this moving to more attempts at UK based production?” someone using the handle Darknetpeach asked. “Surely MDMA and pills can be produced on home soil?” CoronaKid, apparently an importer, said, “We’ll be fine, shipments will still get thru . . . places like Holland will always be the main players for bulk production. . . . Just stock up now if you’re worried.” CoronaKid suggested visiting a dark-Web drug exchange, Empire Market, which he said was well provisioned. Darknetpeach was less sanguine, arguing, “100% there will be coke and heroin shortages.”


Xennt lived a peculiar existence in Traben-Trarbach. The bunker was not designed with domesticity in mind. The entrance to the complex was through a barrier gate, next to a Bundeswehr-era sign that said “halt,” in giant letters. Inside, Xennt was joined by an ever-changing group of perhaps two dozen people, including programmers and technicians from various European countries, several girlfriends, a gardener, a cook, and, for a period in 2015, Sven Kamphuis. Employees and guests were generally given rooms in the old Nazi barracks, where the cook prepared meals. Xennt liked to tell visitors that the barracks had once housed part of Hitler’s eugenics program, but there is no evidence for that claim. There was only one shower in the 1933 structure, and the facilities were rudimentary. Xennt slept in the bunker, on the first underground floor. His bedroom was furnished with black satin sheets, an elaborate sound system, and a life-size figure of the Marvel character War Machine, which stood by his bed.

When Xennt bought the Traben-Trarbach property, he invited his sons, who were now young adults, to work there. Their mother, Angelique, came along, too, though she didn’t work at CyberBunker. According to a childhood friend of the sons, who visited the complex, the family didn’t fully reunite: Angelique and her sons stayed in the aboveground barracks with the other workers.

People from Traben-Trarbach remember Xennt driving into town in a white BMW X6. When Ajax, Amsterdam’s best soccer team, played in the Champions League tournament, Xennt liked to eat pizza at the Costa Smeralda restaurant, then watch the game at a sports bar next door. Sometimes Xennt and his crew visited a strip club in the nearby town of Trier. The staff at the pizzeria and at other local restaurants recall Xennt and his colleagues tipping well. Traben-Trarbach is not a diverse place. Xennt, with his trenchcoat and long yellow hair, stood out, as did his multilingual and multiracial companions. The locals found the group strange but glamorous—like a pirate crew that had unexpectedly docked in town.

A rumor started that Xennt was cultivating cannabis in the bunker, and local people were alarmed by the guard dogs roaming the property. To reassure members of the city council, Xennt occasionally gave tours of the facility. Langer, the mayor who had worked at the complex for the Bundeswehr, visited twice, at Xennt’s invitation. He remembers feeling aggrieved that the jobs Xennt had promised for local people had not materialized, but he saw no marijuana cultivation or any other obvious signs of illegal activity.

The bunker had not changed much since Langer had stopped working there, except that the grounds were a lot messier. There was the same color-coded scheme for differentiating floors. Old maps of Afghanistan hung on the walls. On the fifth level down were the water tanks. On the fourth level down were the generators. On the third level down, an old supercomputer used by the Bundeswehr was still hooked up to a giant screen. On the same floor, a room was filled with racks of Dell computer servers. The heat from these servers warmed the whole bunker, through the air-conditioning vents.

“There was always this funny feeling—what was on those servers?” Langer told me. “And Xennt would say, ‘That’s my customers’ secret.’ ”

When Frank Van der Loos, the Dutch programmer, first visited the bunker complex, in the fall of 2015, he was bowled over by how enormous the property was. He was on the site for two days, and saw “maybe a third of it.” Xennt told Van der Loos that he kept finding new rooms.

Van der Loos also wondered what was on those servers. In 2014, Dutch authorities investigating the dark-Web marketplace Cannabis Road had seized a CyberBunker server housed in Amsterdam, at a facility owned by the company Leaseweb. A Dutch prosecutor explained that the server had been impounded because Xennt was suspected in the trafficking of drugs. Xennt reassured his colleagues at CyberBunker that he had merely leased the impounded server, and hadn’t known what it was used for—a legitimate position, under both Dutch and German law. Xennt told Van der Loos that the Traben-Trarbach servers were, in a similar way, closed books to him. Nevertheless, he felt that he was being spied on by the German police. “I don’t do anything wrong,” Xennt told Van der Loos. “Still, they are watching me.”

Van der Loos was surprised to see that Xennt’s office was littered with phones—there were around thirty modified BlackBerrys on his desk alone. Xennt explained to Van der Loos that the phones were why he had been invited to Traben-Trarbach. He was expanding into an exciting new business.

Bulletproof Web hosting had originally been lucrative, but by 2015 most legitimate sites had migrated to conventional hosters, and competition had driven rental prices down, making the business model less viable. Xennt’s server business generated annual profits of between two and three hundred thousand euros—enough to cover the maintenance costs of the bunker, but not much more. (According to usenix, a nonprofit that studies computing systems, MaxiDed, the Dutch bulletproof-hosting service that was shut down, accrued profits of no more than six hundred and eighty thousand euros in seven years, whereas a child-pornography site that it hosted made more than four million in five years.) Xennt told Van der Loos that he was turning over the day-to-day supervision of CyberBunker’s servers to his eldest son. Xennt’s new project was building an encrypted-phone network, which he called “a money-maker.” He asked Van der Loos to help him.

Around the time of Van der Loos’s visit to the bunker, Nicola Tallant, an Irish crime reporter from the Sunday World, also arrived in Traben-Trarbach. She has a reputation for writing juicy, exclusive stories about Irish criminals. In 2015, she received a tip from a source that a major Irish drug dealer, George Mitchell, had moved from southern Spain to Traben-Trarbach, in order to work on an encrypted-phone business with Xennt. She had never heard of Xennt, but a tourist town in the Mosel Valley is a curious headquarters for a crime boss, and so Tallant decided to investigate.

Mitchell has a portly frame and a distinctive waddle, and is sometimes known as the Penguin. Whenever he visited CyberBunker, he went by Mr. Green. By the mid-nineties, he had become one of Ireland’s most successful importers of illegal drugs. But he abruptly left for Amsterdam after he was linked to the attempted murder of a London gangster and to the creation of Ireland’s first Ecstasy factory. In 1998, Mitchell was arrested in the Netherlands after he was caught unloading a shipment of stolen computer parts, and he spent a year in jail. According to a senior Irish police detective, Mitchell’s drug-importation business thrived even after his Dutch jail term; in 2012, he facilitated the attempted shipment to Ireland of some four hundred kilograms of cocaine—an operation thwarted by the police. The detective told me that Mitchell remained a major figure in the European drug trade until about six years ago. “From ’14 or ’15 onward, we didn’t see much from Mitchell in terms of the importing of drugs,” he said. “It may be that he branched out into other areas.” (In fact, European police intelligence suggests that Mitchell continued to organize large shipments of drugs after 2014. Mitchell has denied any involvement in criminal activities.)

Tallant had her own theory about the Penguin: he was approaching retirement age, and, as the father of several children, he was looking for a way to protect his dependents and his assets. In 2000, his son-in-law, a drug supplier named Derek (Maradona) Dunne, was murdered in Amsterdam. And around the time Mitchell arrived in Traben-Trarbach a dispute among Irish gangs had turned bloody. In September, 2015, Gary Hutch, an Irishman who had previously worked with Mitchell, was killed by a rival group on the south coast of Spain. Mitchell, Tallant surmised, wanted to leave Spain and the gang feud behind, and to reinvest some of his money in a more legitimate-seeming enterprise.

Mitchell had known Xennt for many years, at least from the time of Mitchell’s arrest for handling stolen computer parts, in 1998. (A person familiar with Xennt’s computer business told me that Xennt had bought stolen parts from Mitchell; Xennt declined to comment on this accusation.) Martijn Burger, the businessman once involved in the Public Root movement, remembers Xennt and Mitchell spending time together around the turn of the millennium. Back then, Burger did not know of Mitchell’s status in the criminal world, and teasingly called him Charlie Chaplin, because of his gait. Burger recalled that Mitchell was often accompanied by glamorous young women, and carried a small bag containing “ten to twelve” Nokia phones, each with its phone number written on the back.

When Tallant received her tip, Mitchell had not been photographed in more than two decades. She travelled to Traben-Trarbach twice in the fall of 2015, along with a Sunday World photographer. They watched his movements for several days. He rarely left the apartment complex where he was staying, on the Traben side of town. But on some mornings Xennt picked up Mitchell and took him to breakfast. The pair once ate lunch at a popular local restaurant, the Historische Stadt-Mühle—the Historic Mill. They remained there all afternoon as Mitchell ordered gin-and-tonics and Xennt drank hot chocolate. Tallant was fascinated by Xennt’s appearance: he often wore a floor-length coat, and resembled a Bond villain. “He is sensational-looking,” she told me. “I’ve never seen anyone as weird in all my life.”

Tallant and the photographer eventually found their opportunity one morning, as Mitchell was leaving a restaurant after having breakfast with Xennt and Xyonn. The Penguin wore a navy suit and a black T-shirt; Xennt had on a long black puffer jacket; Xyonn had his hair in dreadlocks.

Tallant walked up to Mitchell and said, “George, quick word—how are you?”

“Very good,” Mitchell replied instinctively, in his broad Dublin accent. Then, surprised at hearing another Irish voice, he peered under the baseball cap that Tallant was wearing, and evidently recognized her. “Fuck off!” he said.

The photographer got his shot. Tallant’s exclusive was published the next Sunday, under the headline “The Lost Godfather.”

The encrypted-phone business is indeed a money-maker. Many people now use end-to-end encrypted-communication apps like Signal and WhatsApp on their smartphones. But, for a small subset of privacy-minded people, such apps are insufficient: they want a specialized, fully encrypted phone that operates on a private network. A “crypto phone” normally costs a user between fifteen hundred and two thousand euros for the handset, and biannual payments of up to a thousand euros for access to a private data network. The handsets—often reëngineered Android or BlackBerry devices—tend to be sold with the camera, the microphone, and location services disabled. The phone typically uses only one end-to-end encrypted-messaging app, which runs on servers that the providers own. Many phones include a panic button that wipes all data from the handset when activated.

Providing or using an encrypted phone is not illegal in Europe or in America, but the devices appear to be used predominantly for illegal activities, and prosecutors have begun finding ways to break up some encrypted networks. In March, 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California brought racketeering-conspiracy charges against Vincent Ramos, the C.E.O. of a Canadian company called Phantom Secure. Six months later, he pleaded guilty to “leading a criminal enterprise that facilitated the transnational importation and distribution of narcotics through the sale of encrypted communication devices and services,” and was sentenced to nine years in prison. Many of Phantom Secure’s customers were members of the Sinaloa drug cartel, in Mexico. It was the first case in the United States in which an encryption-service provider was jailed.

One of the best-known private phone networks is one that collapsed. In April, 2016, Danny Manupassa, the owner of a Dutch company called Ennetcom, was arrested, on suspicion of money laundering and possession of illegal weapons. The servers used by his network, which were housed in Toronto, were seized by Canadian authorities and passed on to the Dutch. Officials in the Netherlands were able to decrypt many communications by Ennetcom users, likely because the company had housed decryption keys on the same server where it stored messages—a catastrophic error. By 2017, the Dutch police had decrypted 3.6 million messages. Several people have since been arrested because of this trove of criminal evidence, including Naoufal Fassih, a Moroccan-Dutch gangster, who was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for attempted murder. (In early July, Dutch, British, and French police announced that they had infiltrated another popular network, EncroChat. This had led to more than eight hundred arrests, across Europe, and to the seizure of huge quantities of guns and drugs—and of some sixty-seven million dollars in “suspect cash.”)

In Traben-Trarbach, Xennt built his own encrypted-phone network and applications with the help of Sven Kamphuis and some programmers in Poland. Xennt explained to me that his apps are “sold and distributed under various brands all over the world, by third parties.” One of the first encrypted-phone apps that Xennt developed, called Underground, was sold on a modified BlackBerry handset. More recently, he developed a messaging app called Exclu, which uses a novel encryption scheme and is sold on a Wileyfox Android device.

Many of Xennt’s initial encrypted-phone customers were in Ireland; his market subsequently spread throughout Europe. Xennt told me that his phone business was more lucrative than his hosting business, although the extent of its profitability is hard to assess without seeing a balance sheet. The F.B.I. reported that Phantom Secure, the company that had facilitated the Sinaloa cartel, had earned annual revenues of eighty million dollars, but that network had between ten and twenty thousand devices—at least twice as many as Xennt’s—and server infrastructure on four continents; it also charged a much higher biannual renewal fee. The yearly profits of Xennt’s phone business likely never went much beyond a million dollars.

During Frank Van der Loos’s 2015 visit to the bunker, Xennt asked him to help develop software for his phones that would include the ability to send money to other users of the private network. According to a former colleague, Xennt also wanted to include a “back door,” so that if a phone was seized, or the network was disabled, Xennt could drain all the funds stored in the application’s escrow account. Van der Loos refused, on ethical grounds. (Xennt told me that he never would have asked for a back-door feature, because it clashes with his “views on privacy.”)

According to two people close to CyberBunker, George Mitchell was not the only investor interested in Xennt’s encrypted-phone business. Danny Manupassa, the former boss of Ennetcom, also travelled to Traben-Trarbach to see Xennt. According to the sources, Manupassa wanted to invest a million euros in Xennt’s network. It seems unlikely that Manupassa did so: after he was arrested, in April, 2016, Ennetcom was shuttered and turned inside out by the Dutch police in a search for information.

The German police’s interest in CyberBunker intensified after the sighting of Mitchell in 2015. They suspected that he might be the guiding figure behind a large criminal enterprise, based in the bunker. A judge allowed the police to tap sixteen of Mitchell’s non-encrypted phones. But, despite glimpses into his criminal dealings, including mentions of shipments of “oranges”—which the police assumed was a coded reference to drugs—there was never enough evidence to charge Mitchell with a crime. In 2016 or 2017, perhaps sensing that he was being watched, he left Traben-Trarbach. Mitchell’s most obvious role before then was as a salesman for Xennt’s encrypted-phone business, which he marketed to members of Colombian drug cartels and to biker gangs in Majorca. “It’s the only way, all my friends use it, everybody,” he told a prospective client on a recorded call.

The police unit in Mainz decided to focus on CyberBunker activities that were provably criminal. Running an encrypted-phone network is not illegal, even though it very often brings providers into contact with known criminals. Similarly, hosting dark-Web sites is not against the law. But if police officers could demonstrate that Xennt and his team were actively assisting the administrators of dark-Web sites that traded in illicit substances or services, they could build a strong case against CyberBunker. Conveniently, Xennt’s operational security was often poor. In the early days at Traben-Trarbach, he and his team occasionally used unencrypted e-mail, which the police were able to monitor. But the authorities needed a better way to establish the relationship between Xennt and his dark-Web clients.

The cybercrime unit developed a bold scheme. With the permission of high-level German authorities, it created its own dark-Web site on Tor: a scam, involving lottery numbers, that accepted payment in bitcoin. The unit’s members made sure that nobody who used the site could lose money—otherwise the officers themselves would be committing a crime—but the site was designed to look as realistic, and as shady, as possible. Designing it was “kind of fun,” an officer admitted to me.

The Mainz team members received permission from their superiors to buy thousands of dollars’ worth of bitcoin, then e-mailed CyberBunker, asking to rent a server. A representative from the company readily agreed, and the undercover officers engaged in a long dialogue with a CyberBunker salesperson. The officers would not share details of that discussion with me, because it would reveal “police tactics,” but they ascertained that Xennt’s company actively assisted clients it knew to be engaged in illicit transactions. CyberBunker even offered some clients tips for hiding their real identities.

The police, meanwhile, began ensnaring Xennt in a more direct fashion. When Frank Van der Loos visited the bunker in 2015, he chastised Xennt for using cheap technology that compromised his operational security. Xennt’s servers were not connected by a virtual-lan cable, which allows the digital traffic from individual servers to remain separated, even if the servers are using the same physical cable. Van der Loos told me that if someone wanted to “listen” to the activity on CyberBunker’s servers, all it took was secretly adding another server to the group. Separately, I learned that in 2018 a young intern at CyberBunker discovered a server on the third floor which looked nothing like the others. Hidden underneath the floorboards, it was connected to the rest of the server bank. When I asked the leader of the Mainz team whether he had asked an informant working in the bunker to install the extra server, as a spying device, he stifled a laugh, then said, “I cannot answer it, and I cannot deny it.” (Xennt told me it was “impossible” that the police had surveilled him in this way.)

By various methods, the police came to believe that CyberBunker was the biggest hoster of illegal Web sites in Germany, and perhaps anywhere in the world. In 2014, it hosted Cannabis Road, the dark-Web marketplace. Between March, 2016, and February, 2018, it hosted the forum Fraudsters, through which counterfeit money, fake I.D.s, and prescription and illicit drugs were traded. Between 2015 and 2018, CyberBunker hosted Flugsvamp, a dark-Web market that accounted for roughly ninety per cent of the online illicit drug trade in Sweden. Xennt’s most significant dark-Web client was a site called Wall Street Market. Between 2016 and 2019, it sold more than thirty-six million euros’ worth of drugs. The site’s administrators took a commission of three per cent on each transaction.

While the Mainz cybercrime unit was building its case against Xennt, a separate international investigation—led by federal police in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands—targeted Wall Street Market. Jörg Angerer, the Koblenz prosecutor, told me it was vital that the prosecution of Wall Street Market proceed before the German police moved against CyberBunker. “There is a chain,” Angerer said. “The hosters are facilitating the real criminals. . . . But first you have to process the real criminals.”

In April, 2019, the police arrested three German men accused of being Wall Street Market’s administrators. On the dark Web, the defendants were known by pseudonyms: Tibo Lousee was coder420; Jonathan Kalla was Kronos; Klaus-Martin Frost was TheOne. Led by officers from Germany’s federal cybercrime unit, which is based in Frankfurt, the police in the three countries worked together to decipher the identities of the administrators, through undercover chats and through clues left by the men online. In a complaint filed in the Central District of California, the three principals were charged not only with running the site but also with planning an “exit scam,” in which they intended to abscond with some eleven million dollars being held in users’ accounts. All three men are awaiting trial.

A week after Wall Street Market was broken up and its leaders arrested, several officers from the B.K.A., Germany’s federal police force, arrived at the Traben-Trarbach bunker to seize evidence relating to the case. A manager at the bunker expressed surprise and readily complied, escorting the officers to the server bank on the third floor. The officers took away the servers used by Wall Street Market, and left the rest.

After Wall Street Market was taken down, Angerer fixed CyberBunker itself in his sights.

On September 26, 2019, everybody at the bunker complex—nine people, including Xennt, his sons, and his girlfriend, Jacqueline—went out for an early dinner at the Historic Mill, leaving the bunker unguarded. It was unusual for all the residents to be gone at the same time, but Xennt’s gardener, Harry, had unexpectedly come into an inheritance, and wanted to celebrate. The leader of the Mainz cybercrime team told me his unit had gathered intelligence that made them “pretty, pretty sure” nobody would be in the bunker during the meal.

At the Historic Mill, antiquated cooking utensils and old guitars hang on the walls. Through a glass panel on the floor, diners can look at the stream that once powered the old mill. Xennt’s group had booked a private area on the mezzanine. It was a Thursday evening at the end of the summer season, and the main dining room, on the ground floor, was nearly full. At around 6 p.m., as the members of Xennt’s party were starting to eat, several patrons on the ground floor revealed themselves to be armed undercover police officers. The officers went upstairs to arrest Xennt and the others. Several armed units of police massed outside the front door. A helicopter buzzed nearby. A Belgian tourist was almost caught up in the arrest when he tried to visit the bathroom on the mezzanine just before Xennt was placed in handcuffs.

A few minutes later, about a hundred police officers—including a contingent from Germany’s federal paramilitary police unit—raided the bunker. They seized four hundred and twelve hard drives, four hundred and three servers, sixty-five USB sticks, sixty-one laptops and computers, fifty-seven phones, piles of paper documents, and about a hundred thousand euros in cash. Some six hundred and fifty officers were involved in the arrests and the raid.

At a press conference the next day, German authorities were jubilant. Jürgen Brauer, the chief prosecutor, declared that it was the first time in German history that arrests were “not directed against the operators of marketplaces but against those who make the crime possible.” CyberBunker was a haven for the world’s worst dark-Web sites, established to help its clients “exclusively for illegal purposes.” Moreover, its operators were connected to people involved in organized crime. (Brauer didn’t name the Penguin—whose current location remains unknown—but he was clearly in his thoughts.) Xennt had been arrested, alongside his two sons, Jacqueline, two Germans, and a Bulgarian. Six other suspects remained at large.

The prosecutors reported that, in November, 2016, the bunker had also provided the command-and-control servers for an attack against Deutsche Telekom, one of Germany’s largest communications companies. The attack had deployed a new weapon called a Mirai-botnet, which harnesses smart appliances and other wireless devices. An attempt to capture the company’s routers failed but caused the network to crash. More than a million Deutsche Telekom customers lost their Internet connection in the attack, costing the company at least two million euros. The incident occurred only a few weeks after an even larger Mirai-botnet attack in Europe and the United States, which disabled Amazon, Netflix, and Twitter, among other sites. Brauer, the prosecutor, said that the people from CyberBunker who had been arrested were accused of “hundreds of thousands of offenses,” ranging from “drugs, counterfeit money, and forged documents” to being “accessories to the distribution of child pornography.”

Sven Kamphuis, the Prince of CyberBunker, was not arrested in the raids of September 26th; nor is he one of the six suspects still at large. After the raid, he claimed that the German police had engaged in “an act of war”—yet he had survived with barely a scratch. The police arrested almost everybody with a connection to the bunker. Given the comprehensiveness of the investigation, the prosecutors’ lack of interest in Kamphuis seemed strange.

Xennt insisted to me that Kamphuis “was not involved in the data center in Germany.” But Kamphuis told me that he had engineered much of the Traben-Trarbach bunker’s infrastructure, and, according to several people, he had also been important in developing the encrypted-phone business for Xennt. Even if Kamphuis’s work was not technically illegal, he was deeply knowledgeable about an organization that the German state believed to be criminal. When details of an indictment were published, in April, the mystery of Kamphuis’s treatment deepened. In the document, prosecutors noted that a search engine had been hosted on the Traben-Trarbach servers: cb3rob.net/darknet. It listed more than sixty-five hundred dark-Web sites, including “marketplaces for narcotics, weapons, counterfeit money, murder orders, and child pornography.” I recalled that CB3ROB is Kamphuis’s online handle.

When I asked Patrick Fata, a senior police officer who oversaw the CyberBunker investigation, why Kamphuis was not accused in the case, he said that Kamphuis’s role in the organization had diminished since 2014, and that the police did not have enough evidence to link him to the administration of Wall Street Market or other illegal sites. I asked Fata if the police had spoken to Kamphuis during the exhaustive six-year investigation. “No,” Fata said, adding, “We don’t know where he is.”

It was surprising that the German police, who had proved so competent in this investigation, had lost track of Kamphuis. After his arrest for the denial-of-service attack on Spamhaus, in 2013, he had spent fifty-five days in a Spanish jail while awaiting extradition to the Netherlands. Ultimately, a judge had placed him on probation for two years. The German and Dutch police coöperated extensively in the early days of the investigation into CyberBunker, and during Kamphuis’s probationary period it would have been easy enough to place legal pressure on him to talk to the German police.

I found Kamphuis without too much difficulty. He agreed to meet me in March, in a train-station café in Middelburg, a pretty Dutch city near the first CyberBunker site. Kamphuis, who was wearing a blue Adidas tracksuit, had piercing blue eyes and a scraggly beard. Some of his teeth were blackened, and a few were missing. Using a tissue, he frequently dabbed at pus weeping from a sore on his eyelid. He drank three strong coffees in about ninety minutes, and his hands kept shaking.

Kamphuis posts on the social-media site Gab, and his stream is a litany of conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic assertions. He told me that he was part of the “libertarian extremist right,” and suggested that a “disproportionate number of Jews” held powerful positions in Europe and America. He often laughed at his own jokes.

I asked him if he had created the dark-Web search engine that had been hosted on Xennt’s servers. He said yes. Later, by text message, he explained that he bore no responsibility for the results of the search engine, because it “finds things indiscriminately,” adding, “That is what search engines do.”

Kamphuis insisted that he had not been an informant against Xennt. He accused a manager at CyberBunker, Tom Funken, of planning the dinner trap at the Historic Mill—even though I had been assured by Xennt’s family that the meal was a setup arranged by the gardener. Xennt told me that he also blamed the gardener, and maintains that there were “no informants” inside the bunker. (Funken was arrested and awaits trial. A recently leaked legal file suggests that, between 2018 and the raid, the gardener was an undercover policeman.)

Although Kamphuis said that he hadn’t been involved regularly with CyberBunker since 2014, he still considered himself “the prince, and currently the head of state,” of the organization. He felt under no legal pressure, he said, because both Spain and the Netherlands “respected his diplomatic immunity.” Kamphuis inveighed against the German police, but he appeared to have profited from their prosecution of Xennt: he said that he was now helping to run Xennt’s encrypted-phone business, which had not been shut down.

After our interview, I texted Kamphuis, and asked him again if he’d ever spoken to the German police. “We don’t negotiate with terrorists,” he said.

Xennt has been imprisoned in Koblenz since his arrest. Although his lawyer would not discuss a legal strategy, Xennt’s defense appears to be that he didn’t know what was on his servers. He told me, “I do not believe that a hoster should accept all kind[s] of content. . . . As soon as a hoster [has] a clear indication that illegal content is hosted then the hoster should cancel the service.” CyberBunker’s willingness to hand over the Wall Street Market servers might buttress that defense. However, a report by Der Spiegel claims that, a day after his arrest, Xennt became emotional and apologetic in a police interview, saying that he was “troubled” by how much illegal activity had flowed through the bunker.

Xennt won’t stand trial until this fall at the earliest, because of delays caused by the coronavirus crisis. Even then, prosecutors will have an incomplete picture of what went on in the bunker. Since the raid, analysts have attempted to sift through the data stored at the facility, which may amount to two thousand terabytes—a herculean task. It would take a large team many years to read a fraction of what was recovered in Traben-Trarbach. In April, however, the prosecutors said that they had identified dozens of CyberBunker clients—and not one of their enterprises was legal.

I wondered what good would come of all the data. A spokesman for the German federal cybercrime unit that led the international investigation into Wall Street Market told me frankly that the war against dark-Web bazaars was unwinnable. Just as Wall Street Market had flourished after the Silk Road’s demise, new markets would grow in the place of Wall Street Market. People would continue to have illicit desires, and the Internet would find ways to satisfy them. Nevertheless, the penetration of the Traben-Trarbach bunker had offered valuable insight into how nefarious elements operated online. “I do not recall any case where this huge amount of criminal-infrastructure data was gathered,” one of the officers in Mainz told me. “We want to learn how the other side is behaving.”

Xennt was formally indicted on April 6th. German authorities stated that he had “made all the business decisions” for CyberBunker, and described him as the head of a “criminal organization.” This depiction was a bit difficult to square with the stranger, more complex reality of Xennt. A patina of idealism, however misguided, seemed to be essential to him. A police officer who monitored him for several years said that Xennt’s seedier qualities were accompanied by a utopian outlook—“free Internet, freedom of speech, nobody controls what’s out there, stuff like that.” The officer conceded, “This is no bank heist. It’s not like he’s a billionaire.”

In March, I visited Xennt’s sister and brother-in-law, Anna and René Van Wolferen, in a village near Arnhem. The Van Wolferens have a tidy, well-appointed home, with a wood-burning stove in the sitting room. René works for a pharmaceutical company and is an auxiliary firefighter. He wore a beeper on his belt, and a T-shirt with the slogan “We Face What You Fear.” Anna is a tall woman with auburn hair and a friendly, anxious manner. They showed me an Exclu phone that Xennt had sent them from the bunker. Neither of them had ever unwrapped it; to show me how it worked, they had to charge it for twenty minutes.

The Van Wolferens explained that Xennt had always lived “on the edge,” but was hardly a cackling mastermind. (The Sunday World, the Irish tabloid, recently called Xennt the “lord of the darknet.”) Rather, he was a brilliant, dreamy, somewhat naïve person, who had swum out of his depth. They worried about his state of mind in prison, where he played chess against himself all day, and had almost no contact with the outside world. Xennt and Anna’s father died in January, and Xennt’s lawyer had asked permission for her client to attend the funeral. The request was denied. Xennt then asked for a laptop to watch a live stream of the service, and this was also refused.

The Van Wolferens spoke again and again about Xennt’s childhood bedroom in Arnhem, and how he had always been fascinated by a futuristic aesthetic. René said that, in late middle age, Xennt had begun dabbling in cannabinoid treatments, because he was interested in remaining “forever young.” He described his brother-in-law as someone with arrested development. “His whole world was science fiction,” René said.

This was an astute observation. People connected to CyberBunker spoke about the world purely in terms of what was online. They didn’t talk about the Netherlands, a country of seventeen million people. They called it by its domain name: “.nl.” Similarly, they spoke of “kinderporno,” an Internet term for child pornography. In many jurisdictions, there is no such thing as child pornography; any image of a child having sex is considered evidence of abuse. It was in Xennt’s commercial interest to ignore the link between the three-dimensional world and what appeared on computer screens. But his many years in windowless rooms may have blinded him to the link altogether. When I asked Xennt if CyberBunker knew that it was hosting the Pirate Bay, the content-sharing site, he responded with the kind of dodge that could be applied to even the darkest material: “If a customer does not reveal its name to CyberBunker, then the CyberBunker crew does not know who the customer is.”

When Anna was out of the room, René admitted that Xennt had apparently sometimes gone “over the edge.” For reasons that were unclear to René, Xennt often hid his business interests behind charitable foundations. The Van Wolferens’ home was listed as an address of one of those foundations. As a result, the couple had been visited more than once by the Dutch police, who asked René about illegal content hosted on CyberBunker’s servers. And an Irish criminal connected to Xennt’s phone business had once arrived at the Van Wolferen home. René recognized him as a gangster of some kind, and ejected him. René was fond of his brother-in-law, but he told him that his businesses led him to mix with “people who are not legal.”

In April, I wrote a letter to Xennt in prison, which was delivered by his lawyer. The sole condition of our correspondence was that we could not discuss matters that might directly affect the trial. Xennt replied to me in May. He wrote in English, in blue pen, on grid paper. His writing was capitalized, except when he used the word “I.” He told me he believed that the authorities had targeted his hosting business as a means to “stop the development of the secure communication app.” He added, with a few misspellings, “The next version would have a wallet that would have enabled its users to make unlimited instand anonymous payments. That—of corse—would not make authorities very happy.” Xennt was passing the time by writing a book about “privacy and what happened to me.” He said that he had already “sold the exclusive rights to a movie studio.” (I could find no evidence of this.)

In my letter, I asked Xennt about the infatuation that had dominated his unusual life: bunkers. He told me about his childhood visits to the Second World War complex in Arnhem, and about how that space had bewitched him. “I instantly fell in love with it,” he recalled. He said that the first CyberBunker, in Goes, was the realization of “a dream” to own “one of these facilities and to renovate it to make it a modern hi-tech stronghold.” But he could go no deeper. Xennt wrote, “I am unable to explain why I like bunkers. Why does someone like a hamburger? Why do they like motor sport? I cannot answer that. I just like bunkers. That is all.”

Ed Caesar